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ABSTRACT

Tenney, Curtis G. M.A. Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Applied Behavioral
Science Graduate Program, Wright State University, 2021. Meritocracy-Based Stickiness
Measure of Social Mobility.

I measure the stickiness of social mobility in terms of meritocratic assumptions
through the first-known Meritocracy-Based Stickiness Measure of Mobility (MBSMoM)
using mobility transition matrices and assumptions based on Full Meritocracy (FM) and
Lack of Meritocracy (LM). I develop the Simple Stickiness Measure of Mobility
(SSMoM) and the Weighted Stickiness Measure of Mobility (WSMoM). In addition, I
create the MBSMoM which is calculated from mobility transition matrices of
intragenerational, intergenerational, and multigenerational correlations using various
measures of status including education, occupation, class, consumption, income, and
wealth. Utilizing mobility transition matrices employed by plethora of studies,
MBSMoMs are calculated as a percentage between SSMoMs or WSMoMs under
assumptions of FM and LM. The MBSMoM is a standalone measure and is interpreted
as the percentage between outcomes under FM and LM assumptions. I calculate
MBSMoM values for 92 mobility matrices from 22 previous studies of mobility and
report individual and group results.
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MERITOCRACY-BASED STICKINESS MEASURE OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

I. INTRODUCTION
Mobility research has been addressing the concern for inequality for many
decades. There is great inequality in the world with over 1.2 billion people living “in
extreme poverty,” the top one percent owning forty percent of wealth, and the bottom 50
percent owning less than one percent of assets (Mishra, 2018, p. 271). Equality, equality
of opportunity, and social mobility are important topics of interest to sociologists,
economists, and policy makers. Interestingly, not all forms of inequality are “ethically
objectionable” (Roemer & Trannoy, 2016, p. 1288). In fact, by concentrating on equality
of opportunity, society demonstrates its willingness to accept some inequality in
outcomes (Stokey, 1996). Since outcomes are a result of opportunity, ability, actions,
and luck, equality of opportunity implies eradicating differences due to varying
opportunities and luck, so ability and effort alone result in outcome inequality (Roemer &
Trannoy, 2016; Stokey, 1996). Equality and mobility are different concepts and can
coexist at different levels: “rising inequality may (but need not) be accompanied by
reduced intergenerational mobility” (Becker et al, 2018, p. S10). For this reason, “today,
the literature on intergenerational mobility is integral to the social sciences and draws
significant interest from policy circles” (Nybom & Stuhler, 2019, p. 77). Both inequality
and mobility are “important indicators used to evaluate and compare the quality of life in
modern societies” (Burkhauser & Couch, 2008, p. 522). In fact, mobility researchers
often seek the holy grail, “the true rate of social mobility” (Clark, 2013, p. 1). This
demonstrates that “assessing the extent to which economic advantages are transmitted
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across generations is quite a difficult endeavor” (Mitnik et al., 2019, p. 406). There is
even disagreement among authors about the basic nature of mobility. Some claim it is
variable across social structure, government policy, time, place, and subpopulations while
others insist it is “a universal constant across societies, changing little across social
systems and epochs” (Clark, 2013, p. 7). Solon (2018) quoted Clark (2013) as asserting
that “all social mobility is governed by a simple underlying law, independent of social
structure and government policy,” even though Clark’s thesis is not well supported
empirically (pp. F340, F349). Income and wealth are often touted as indicators of
mobility (Burkhauser & Couch, 2008; Clark, 2013; Mitnik et al., 2019; Nybom &
Stuhler, 2019; Roemer & Trannoy, 2016; Solon, 2018; Stokey, 1996).
Both income and wealth inequality and their growth are often presented as
evidence of a lack of meritocracy in the United States (US), especially since the US is
considered one of the “least mobile societies among those rich countries” (Corak, 2004,
p. 9). Meritocracy is a matter of degree: “However meritocratic most liberal-democracies
are, they’re far from being fully-fledged meritocracies” (Young, 2015, p. 14). Even
today, there is still “the modern view of the United States as one of the least
economically mobile countries among advanced economies” so, “the view of the United
States as a highly mobile society and a ‘land of opportunity’ may be unwarranted”
(Smeeding, 2018, p. 38). Daniel Markovits claimed that meritocracy “is stifling social
mobility” and is leading to an American class war (Damazer, 2019, p. 1). He took the
view that, although it was supposed to equalize opportunity, meritocracy has actually
concentrated wealth among the few and is the source of transmitting privilege, and is “a
lose-lose arrangement” (Voegeli, 2019, pp. 1-2). On the other hand, others have praised
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the US for its meritocratic atmosphere (Corak, 2004; Damazer, 2019; Smeeding, 2018;
Voegeli, 2019; Young, 2015).
Saunders (2010) claimed, “we are much closer to achieving a meritocracy than
most pundits or politicians seem to suppose” (p. 9). He claimed that “generally,
sociologists have assumed that unequal outcomes…signify unfair selection procedures”
(Saunders, 2010, p. 47). Despite the belief that “equal opportunity would lead to true
meritocracy, which would be true egalitarianism”, inequality and immobility in the US
have been blamed for all sorts of social problems even though we still do not fully
understand their source and effects (Celarent, 2009, p. 322). Many studies have found a
negative relationship between inequality and mobility: “Wealth is rising to the top as a
dynastic force that limits intergenerational mobility and preserves economic status”
(Smeeding, 2018, p. 38). However, inequality is not necessarily a cause of immobility
because institutional forces such as the welfare regime and specific government policy
affect both inequality and mobility in society. Before inequality and immobility may be
determined as sources of social problems requiring correction, we must understand their
nature and workings. This is important because equality of opportunity is vital in
economies reliant on human capital—particularly education—for growth and economic
efficiency (Corak, 2004). Nonetheless, there is no obvious way of determining the extent
of opportunity individuals really have in society (Celarent, 2009; Corak, 2004; Saunders,
2010; Smeeding, 2018).
The purpose of this study is to build on prior research by developing a Simple
Stickiness Measure of Mobility (SSMoM), a Weighted Stickiness Measure of Mobility
(WSMoM), and a Meritocracy-Based Stickiness Measure of Mobility (MBSMoM) which
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may be used with mobility transition matrices of intragenerational, intergenerational, and
multigenerational correlations of various measures of status including education,
occupation, class, consumption, income, and wealth from multiple and varying studies.
Intragenerational is within a single generation while intergenerational indicates across
two generations and multigenerational spans more than two generations (Hout, 1983;
Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013; Torche, 2015).
This research formulates an MBSMoM—a way to use the idea of meritocracy in
the measure of mobility in education, class, occupation, consumption, income, and wealth
levels which may be used with intragenerational, intergenerational, and multigenerational
mobility transition matrices. Using mobility transition matrices similar to those used by
many studies, real-world MBSMoMs are calculated as a percentage between SSMoMs or
WSMoMs under the assumptions of Full Meritocracy (FM), or “perfect mobility”
(represented by equally distributed “generational mobility”) and its opposite, Lack of
Meritocracy (LM) (represented by an absence of “generational mobility”) (Corak, 2004,
p. 3; Saunders, 2010, p. 10). One may think of FM, or “perfect mobility,” as a society
with randomly distributed success characteristics with equal opportunity, leading to
randomly distributed education, class, occupation, consumption, income, and wealth
outcomes (Saunders, 2010, p. 10). LM is the total absence of any mobility. Of course,
FM and LM are polar opposites within which real-world societies fit. It is important not
to equate equal opportunity or fairness with intergenerational class, educational,
occupational, consumption, income or wealth mobility (Corak, 2004). Otherwise, policy
proposals in pursuit of meritocracy may tend to impinge on other values and individual
rights (Saunders, 2010). The MBSMoM is a standalone measure and is interpreted as the
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percentage between outcomes under FM and LM assumptions. The MBSMoM may also
be used in research to make comparisons between social structures, governmental
policies, and of population subsets, across time, space, and by identity (race, ethnicity,
nationality, gender, sexuality, religion, ability, age, etc.) (Corak, 2004; Pfeffer and
Killewald, 2018; Saunders, 2010).

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Equality, equality of opportunity, and social mobility are all related to the
American Dream. Urahn et al. (2012) asserted that “the ideal that all Americans have
equality of opportunity regardless of their economic status at birth is the crux of the
American Dream and a defining element of our national psyche” (p. 1). Even in 1931,
James Truslow Adams wrote:
The American Dream is that dream of a land in which life should be better
and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to
ability or achievement…It is not a dream of motor cars and high wages
merely, but a dream of social order in which each man and each woman
shall be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they are innately capable,
and be recognized by others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous
circumstances of birth or position (Bloom, 2011, p. 1).
In the early part of the twentieth century, the American dream included individual equal
opportunity and social meritocracy. Even today, “America’s promise is predicated on
economic mobility” (Bradbury, 2011, p. 1). Therefore, one of the fundamental questions
facing the United States today is “whether there is a sufficient degree of equality of
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opportunity” (Smeeding, 2018, p. 38). But equality of opportunity can itself lead to a
widening gap of inequality (Littler, 2018).
The word meritocracy was first used by Alan Fox in 1956 (Littler, 2018). Two
years later, Michael Young popularized the term in The Rise of the Meritocracy, 18702033: An Essay on Education and Equality, even though he “always found equality as a
notion extremely difficult” (Young, 1994a, p. 73). Some people in America view
meritocracy in terms of income and/or wealth outcomes, but class (social status),
educational, and occupational outcomes have also been important. Occupation may be a
more stable variable than income or wealth since it could be “less age or year dependent”
(Song et al, 2020, p. 257). For example, occupational rank-rank correlations are
estimated to be around “0.32” (Song et al., 2020, p. 252). The measurement of income
and wealth Inter-Generational Elasticities (IGE) have evolved over time and are currently
estimated to be “between 0.30 and 0.60” (Torche, 2015, p. 56). In addition, income and
wealth intergenerational correlation coefficients are predicted to be “between 0.50 and
0.60” (Keister, 2014, p. 349). This implies that approximately “half of economic
advantages are transmitted from parent to children” (Mitnik et al., 2019, p. 380).
There have been myriad mobility studies conducted in the past 50 years (Bloom,
2011; Bradbury, 2011; Keister, 2014; Littler, 2018; Mitnik et al., 2019; Smeeding, 2018;
Song et al., 2020; Torche, 2015; Urahn et al., 2012; Young, 1994a). Studies of mobility
have been conducted with widely varied approaches and methods. Solon (2017) summed
up what we know concerning mobility: “…the playing field is far from level. Children
from poor families are at a substantial disadvantage relative to children from well-off
families” (p. 5). Jäntti and Jenkins (2013) pointed out that this disadvantage of a “lack of
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social mobility implies inequality of opportunity,” so mobility, while “socially desirable,”
in actuality “is an imperfect indicator of the degree of inequality of opportunity” (p. 13).
To Michael Young (1958), both “intelligence and effort together make up merit” (p. 94).
He “disapproved of equality of opportunity on the grounds that it gave the appearance of
fairness to the massive inequalities created by capitalism” (Young, 2015, p. 9). Young
(1994a) saw “that equality of opportunity, which had so much more of a following than
equality, was itself going to produce greater inequality” (p. 73). As it turned out,
meritocracy developed into a positive term rather than keeping the negative connotation
Michael Young intended (Young, 2015). In fact, Toby Young (2015), Michael’s son
said, “the answer is more meritocracy” (p. 10). The idea behind meritocracy is that “even
children born into the humblest of circumstances can succeed if they are bright and they
work hard” (Saunders, 2010, p. 3). Meritocracy has developed such a strong following
mainly because it counters “established hierarchies” and “reacts against inherited
privilege” (Littler, 2017, p. 4; Littler, 2018, p. 48). Today, meritocracy is the concept of
fairness within society so that one may use their intelligence, ability, talents, and effort to
earn their just deserts and achieve success (Damazer, 2019; Littler, 2018; Stokey, 1996).
Inequality of outcomes is acceptable because if talent and effort are normally distributed,
“so should a meritocratic distribution of wealth and income” (VannPashak, 2019, p. 3).
However defined, meritocracy is directly opposed to the “SAD thesis,” the belief that
“Social Advantage and Disadvantage conferred at birth is what shapes peoples’ destinies”
(Saunders, 2010, p. 3). The Social Advantage and Disadvantage (SAD) thesis was
originally based on a study conducted by Glass (1954), which produced impossible
findings using outdated data and flawed statistics (Saunders, 2010, pp. 11-12).
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Not everyone agrees that inequality matters, but most are concerned about the
magnitude of inequality. Even after the reduction in savings and investment during the
1980s, average income and wealth have increased in the US along with growing
inequality. Thomas Hobbes saw no problem with growing inequality if income and
wealth were increasing because: “felicity consists in continually prospering” (Ryan,
2002, p. 227). Saunders (2010) found that when accounting for individual Intelligent
Quotient (IQ) scores, mobility reflects what would be expected in a complete
meritocracy. Of course, IQ scores and Socio-Economic Status (SES) have been shown to
be correlated. Even so, about fourteen percent of the top 5 percentiles of IQs come from
parents with below-average IQs (Saunders, 2010). Some make the case for “sufficient
equality” because too much inequality is just too “unpleasant,” “dysfunctional,” “ugly,”
and “stupid” (Galbraith, 2002, p. 201). Others advocate that inequality only matters due
to emotions of envy and glory. Still others believe that inequality is only acceptable if
based on needs, resources, or abilities. Whether inequality is bad or good, “wealth is
systematically related to income, point in the life cycle, and other demographic
characteristics. But apart from those differences, there remains great residual
heterogeneity in wealth holding” (Hurst et al., 1998, p. 268). While income and wealth
have grown overall, not all individuals or groups of people have experienced that growth
equally (Galbraith, 2002; Herrnstein and Murray, 1994; Hurst et al., 1998; Murray, 2012;
Ryan, 2002; Saunders, 2010).
Even though “much of what happens to individuals in the course of their lifetimes
is down to chance and idiosyncratic circumstances,” some authors have hinted at the
stickiness of class, education, occupation, consumption, income, and wealth (Saunders,
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2010, p. 2). Pfeffer and Killewald (2018) provided “estimates of the multigenerational
persistence of family wealth,” and referred to the “intergenerational rigidity of the wealth
structure” (pp. 1415, 1416, 1433, 1436). Saunders (2002) alluded to this stickiness when
stating that “while class origins have some effect on class destinations (in particular, for
those born into the middle class), ability and effort exert a much greater effect” (p. 559).
Some researchers have explicitly labelled the persistence in education, occupation, class,
consumption expenditures, income, and wealth as being sticky. When discussing class
mobility, Saunders (2010) referred to “stickiness” (p. 36). He identified the “stickiness of
middle-class downward mobility rates…as the principal weakness in the meritocracy
thesis” (Saunders, 2010, p. 89). In contradiction, Urahn et al. (2012) identified the “lack
of relative mobility” as “a phenomenon known as stickiness at the ends” (pp. 6, 2).
Identifying non-linearities, Pfeffer and Killewald (2015) “hypothesize that wealth
positions at the top and bottom of the distribution may be particularly sticky” (p. 4).
Authors have also referred to the opposite of stickiness, using the terms
“intergenerational fluidity,” “social fluidity,” and “churning in economic position”
(Charles and Hurst, 2003, pp. 1155, 1157, 1163, 1179-1180; Torche, 2015, p. 42). In the
US, “people are largely faring better than prior generations” which creates “individual
well-being even in the face of growing inequality” (Keister, 2014, p. 363). Of course,
equality of opportunity and rewards based on merit are still major goals of Americans.
Friedrich Hayek, along with others, criticized outcome equality for practical reasons that
it is too costly in liberty and human terms (Young, 2015). Regardless of whether
inequality matters to everyone, it seems desirable to have a common definition of
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meritocracy (Arrow et al., 2000; Charles and Hurst, 2003; Galbraith, 2002; Keister,
2014; Pfeffer and Killewald, 2018; Ryan, 2002; Saunders, 2002; Young, 2015).
Meritocracy and Mobility
Unlike the extremes of egalitarianism (equality of outcomes) and libertarianism
(just entitlement), “the essence of a meritocratic society is that it offers individuals equal
opportunities to become unequal…is inherently competitive and it produces losers as
well as winners” (Saunders, 2010, pp. 124, 131-134). Meritocracy works fine for those
found with the right merit, but not so well for those who lack what is valued within
society (Saunders, 2010). There are multiple accepted definitions of meritocracy. A basic
definition of meritocracy in the US is “the ability to get ahead through hard work” (Solt
et al., 2016, p. 1). There are two main ways to view equality: opportunity, and outcome.
Equality of opportunity and outcome have generally accepted definitions. To
sociologists, equality of opportunity refers to equal individual freedom of all to pursue
their own development and to “apply themselves to the best of their ability” while
equality of outcome means equal access to “rewards and resources” (Johnson, 2000, p.
107). Meritocracy involves a social environment in which personal success depends on
individual merits like “talents, abilities and effort,” and implies the existence of fair
measures of merit and equal opportunity (Johnson, 2000, p. 191). By assuming that
merit must be evenly distributed among social classes, income levels, and wealth
holdings, some define meritocracy in terms of an open and fair society where everyone
has an equal statistical opportunity to rise or fall in order to end up in different social
status’ (Saunders, 2010).
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Operationalizing these concepts in research is much more difficult than
understanding the theoretical definitions. One study, referring to the belief in
meritocracy, used “three distinctly different measures of meritocracy” (Solt et al., 2016,
p. 1). Most research dealing with income and wealth equality within meritocratic ideals
has attempted to explain “generational mobility…the relationship between the socioeconomic status of parents—more particularly to their income—and the status and
income their children will attain in adulthood” (Corak, 2004, p. 3). Some mobility
researchers assume that equality of opportunity may be proven if the “conditional
distribution of children’s income does not vary across parental incomes” (Mitnik et al.,
2019, p. 383).
Meritocracy and fairness are not necessarily the same thing (Corak, 2004;
Johnson, 2000; Solt et al., 2016). Meritocracy and fairness have been entangled in
research involving the general population, work environments, university admissions, and
education in general. Education is particularly sensitive because of the belief that “a
meritocratic education underpins a meritocratic society” (Young, 1994b, p. 88). Some
observe that inborn talents are undeserved and distributed like a “natural lottery” since
“some people are more gifted than others, the same amount of effort will reap different
rewards, depending on their natural endowments” (Young, 2015, pp. 10-11). In fact,
“Being a member of the ‘lucky sperm club’ confers no moral right to advantage” (Young,
1994b, p. 89). With equality of opportunity, inequality is ethically acceptable if it is “due
to differential effort” rather than “differential circumstances” (Dardanoni et al., 2008, p.
2). One approach—value-in-merit—proposes an environment of “equal opportunity and
meritocratic outcomes,” and another—multicultural meritocracy—combines “value-in-
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diversity elements of multiculturalism with the equal opportunity components of a valuein-merit ideology” (Gündemir et al., 2017, p. 34). Elite university admissions processes
have long been criticized as inherently unfair and non-meritocratic. But one study found
the admissions process at the University of Oxford highly meritocratic and indicated that
what may be needed is a more fair “outcomes-based meritocracy” implemented by the
University of California because of the inequality that leads to disparate educational
outcomes in public schools (Nahai, 2013, p. 681). This has led to advocating for a lottery
system for elite university admissions due to the SAT being a source of admission
inequality by reproducing class, income, wealth, racial, and gender privilege. What may
be needed is to counteract “a meritocracy based on unequal competitor starting points,
and in which merit is continuously defined and redefined in ways that favor the dominant
social groups” (Nahai, 2013, p. 699). This leads to the belief that affirmative action is
required to compensate those who lack non-meritocratic advantages. If we understand
that inequality is not necessarily unfair if it is the result of equal opportunity to use one’s
talent and effort to find a place in society, then meritocracy is a worthy goal (Saunders,
2010). In addition, belief in meritocracy may depend heavily on where in the class,
occupation, income, and wealth spectrum people fall (Gündemir, 2017; Nahai, 2013;
Soares, 2017; Solt et al., 2016; Walton et al., 2013; Warikoo, 2017).
There are various opinions about the sources and effects of inequality. In fact,
some conflate equality and meritocracy. While meritocracy means different things to
different people and is not commonly defined, it usually involves the existence of a
system that rewards people based on their valued contributions rather than their
genealogy. Genealogy may include both history and inheritance. Many researchers
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associate equality of opportunity with merit-based rewards, which generally leads to
eschewing advantages based on birth, except for inborn talents and intellect. Under the
condition of equal opportunity, as Young (2015) asserts, cognitive ability is “a better
predictor of achievement in school and occupational status than the standard
environmental factors singled out by liberal policy-makers” (p. 12). In fact, IQ scores
predict SES better than the SES of parents, although parent education is a fair predictor of
child education and thus child SES. Peter Saunders (2010) showed that parent education
is twice as important than parental class. What many people do not understand is that
“merit-based rewards, may, in fact, generate considerable inequality” (Sen, 2000, p. 14).
Benabou (2000) believed that equal opportunity within a merit-based system may lead to
social and economic mobility but not necessarily to equality of outcomes. In fact,
“imposing equality of outcomes is unmeritocratic” (Benabou, 2000, p. 320). When
advancing to a dynamic measure including intergenerational effects, “parents’ outcomes
determine children’s opportunities” (Benabou, 2000, p. 322).
Measuring mobility is not necessarily easy, given the diverse understandings of
the concept (Benabou, 2000; Saunders, 2010; Sen, 2000; Young, 2015). Various methods
have been attempted to measure meritocracy. Phillips (2016) investigated meritocracy
with an evaluation of new fellows for membership in fellowship societies. He posited
that quantitative assessment of objective and subjective elements may be combined in
meritocratic measurement of individuals. It is common to measure meritocracy in studies
of bureaucracies. Rather than objectively measuring the existence of meritocracy, this
branch of the literature has relied on opinion surveys of experts, citizens, and public
employees. Charron et al. (2016) showed that evaluating bureaucracies relies on
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definitions of meritocracy in terms of government employee recruitment and promotion
as opposed to political appointment. Goode (2016) developed a six-question inventory of
meritocracy endorsement called the Meritocracy Scale, which measures individual
attitudes toward meritocracy. Directly measuring meritocracy has eluded us and
modeling it has been uncommon (Charron et al., 2016; Goode, 2016; Phillips, 2016).
Roland Benabou (2000) seems to be the only author to theorize a model of
meritocracy. He modeled two separate types of meritocracy. The first was meritocracy
of opportunity which included comparing the variances of a person’s lifetime income
resulting from intrinsic qualities compared to their total lifetime income. Benabou’s
second theoretical construct of meritocracy focused on the meritocracy of outcomes.
Meritocracy of outcomes includes the intrinsic qualities income coefficient and the
redistribution tax rate. Benabou (2000) combined these two models of meritocracy into
an overall construct of meritocracy. While he created a theoretical model involving the
oppositional nature of opportunity and outcome, Benabou (2000) did not propose an
operational measure of either one.
Patterns of Mobility
Even though “there are multiple concepts of mobility,” we will consider social
mobility as “the movement of individuals from one position in society to another” (Jäntti
and Jenkins, 2013, p. 2; Saunders, 2010, p. 1). Torche (2015) summarized mobility with
the following:
Social scientists operationalize mobility as the extent and pattern of
association between parents’ and adult children’s socioeconomic standing
where higher association means less mobility. Socioeconoimc standing is
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captured by different measures—the most common are social class,
occupational status, individual earnings, and family income (pp. 37-38).
While sociologists typically concentrate on social class, education, and occupation,
economists tend to favor consumption, income, and wealth measures (Solon, 2018;
Torche, 2015). Income stability is usually preferred by individuals when all other things
are equal (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013). While inequality is about a static snapshot, mobility
is a dynamic look at “status from one time period or generation to another” and may be
intragenerational, intergenerational, or multigenerational (Fields & Ok, 1999a, p. 557).
Intragenerational, Intergenerational and Multigenerational Mobility
Intragenerational mobility is concerned with social status changes for individuals:
“Intragenerational mobility refers to observed differences in the economic circumstances
of individuals over time” (Burkhauser & Couch, 2008, p. 524). Intergenerational
mobility is defined in terms of the movement of social status across single generational
boundaries like parent to child. “Multigenerational mobility refers to the associations in
socio-economic status across three or more generations” (Solon, 2018, p. F340). Pfeffer
and Killewald (2015) explained that “demographic shifts” including decreasing fertility
rates, increasing longevity, and changes in marriage rates and tenure have been increasing
the effect of “extended family networks” (pp. 5-6).
Absolute vs. Relative Mobility
Mobility may be analyzed from an absolute or relative standpoint (Burkhauser & Couch,
2008; Fields & Ok, 1999a; Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013; Pfeffer and Killewald, 2015;
Saunders, 2010; Solon, 2018; Torche, 2015). Inequality of outcomes “is not the
appropriate yardstick for assessing the fairness of a given allocation or social system”
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(Ferreira & Gignoux, 2011, p. 2). As Saunders (2010) pointed out, relative mobility does
not necessarily reflect fairness or equal opportunity within society, but mobility could
equalize ex-ante opportunities without having any equalizing effect on ex-post outcomes.
This is important because “if fairness matters to economic agents and alters their
behavior, then understanding fairness ought to matter even to the purest positive
economist” (Brunori et al., 2013, p. 2). Equal Opportunity involves the idea that ex ante
inequality due to individuals’ circumstances such as resources and/or opportunities—
race, ethnicity, gender, birthplace, parent’s education and/or occupation—is unfair but
any inequality as a result of individual ability and effort is acceptable. Therefore,
equality of opportunity “implies that differences in status are ethically acceptable if they
are due to differential effort but not if they are due to differential circumstances”
(Dardanoni et al., 2008, p. 2). These inherited traits may impact intelligence and effort
(Brunori et al., 2013; Ferreira & Gignoux, 2011; Lefranc et al., 2006; Stokey, 1996).
Many sociologists and economists simply dismiss heritability as a possible
explanation for the stickiness of class, education, occupation, consumption, income, and
wealth. Instead, they assume “intelligence is randomly distributed” rather than passed on
from parents (Saunders, 2010, p. 50). Economists tend to assume that genetics has a
much less impact on mobility than the investment in human capital which may develop
into a “human capital elite” (Becker et al., 2018, pp. S8-S9). Others accept both nature
and nurture: “richer parents tend to have more favorable endowments, which tend to be
passed on to their children through genetic and cultural inheritance” (Solon, 2018, p.
F344). Some researchers agree that cognitive ability, which is determined by “both
genetics and environment,” may have a direct effect on social mobility (Saunders, 2010,
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p. 56). Referring to racial gaps, Mazumder (2014) commented that “cognitive skills…are
strongly associated with these gaps,” but this doesn’t necessarily mean that they form at
birth (p. 2). Hans Eysenck has claimed that genetics (“perhaps 50 percent”) may be twice
as strong than environment when it comes to intelligence (Saunders, 2010, pp. 56, 58).
Even grandparents’ traits may skip a generation and they “may contribute to cultural
inheritance” (Solon, 2018, p. F345). Just because correlations of intelligence of
approximately 0.50 between children and their parents indicates heritability of mental
ability, it does not prove the meritocracy thesis, but is consistent with the data and
plausible, along with other explanations (Saunders, 2010). Of course, Hill (2003) who
said, “All you are or ever shall become is the result of the use to which you put your
mind,” would have disagreed with this inheritance hypothesis, since he researched the
important characteristics of success and promoted their learned nature (p. xxv).
Absolute mobility means analyzing total mobility or “absolute changes” in social,
educational, occupational, consumption, income, or wealth status (Fields & Ok, 1999a,
pp. 564, 568). The measures used focus on objective rather than relative measures. For
income and wealth, absolute measurement of mobility compares children’s amounts to
their parents’ values (Urahn et al., 2012). When it comes to occupations, absolute
mobility has been operationalized as “the change in average occupational status over
time” of “the total observed flows between classes of origins and classes of destination”
(Torche, 2015, pp. 39, 41). Relative mobility typically uses quantiles that result in a
zero-sum game as far as mobility is concerned and often use regression models to
estimate persistence coefficients or elasticities (Torche, 2015). Relative mobility refers
to…and is a “zero-sum game” because “every increase in upward mobility requires a
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corresponding increase…in downward mobility” (Voegeli, 2019, p. 3). When it comes to
relative measures, groups are divided into equal-sized quantile (percentile, quartile,
decile, etc.) groups, show relative reranking, and “are called fractile matrices” (Fields &
Ok, 1999a, p. 567; Torche, 2015, p. 51). Most researchers use “strongly relative
measures” (Fields & Ok, 1999a, p. 563). While many researchers emphasize relative
mobility, most individuals are concerned with absolute mobility for their children: “What
matters most to them is that their chance to succeed in life has improved, irrespective of
whether everybody else’s chances have improved by a similar degree” (Saunders, 2010,
p. 22). Structural mobility concerns fluctuations in mobility due to variations in the
numbers of positions available in various social classes, while exchange mobility deals
with “movement among social classes, for a given distribution of positions among these
classes” (Fields & Ok, 1999a, p. 564).
Measures of Mobility
Varying units of measure have been used in mobility research, creating
differences between measurements of individuals, families, households, or a combination
(Torche, 2015). The principal variables used in mobility research are social class, SES,
education, occupation, consumption, earnings, income, and wealth. Even though they are
related to individual life chances, social classes are usually aggregated so that they may
exclude the measurement of “important variation in socioeconomic advantage”
(Saunders, 2010, p. 1; Torche, 2015). Besides using broad occupational categories,
researchers use occupational status, which is typically “a weighted average of the mean
level of earnings and education of detailed occupations” (Torche, 2015, p. 38). Income
or earnings mobility research typically pursues relative mobility by using linear
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regression of the logarithms of income/earnings or quantile (percentile, decile, quintile,
quartile) ranks of these variables (Torche, 2015). Because permanent expected income is
the theoretical determinant of consumption and well-being, it is the important theoretical
variable which has sometimes avoided practical measurement. Researchers often rely on
short- or long-run income averages to approximate permanent income. Researchers have
created multiple single-number summaries, referred to as mobility measures or indices,
even though they result in loss of information (Trede, 1998).
There has been a proliferation of measures of mobility with “at least 20 mobility
measures…used in the literature” (Mishra, 2018, p. 276). A mobility measure may be
defined as a function on a mobility transition matrix M, F(M), which maps M into a
single scalar. There are some limitations involved in creating summary mobility
measures. In order to measure mobility, longitudinal data is required (Fields & Ok,
1996) but “no single mobility statistic has the minimum requirements regarded as
essential” (King, 1983, p. 108). There are many descriptive measures of mobility
(Chakravarty et al., 1985; Fields, 2010). Since comparing mobility transition matrices
from different locations, times, or populations to show mobility relationships is difficult,
researchers have created different measures of mobility for different situations
(Burkhauser & Couch, 2008). Indices may focus “on positional change,
individual…growth, longer-term inequality reduction, or…risk” (Jäntti and Jenkins,
2013, p. 49). It is important to define mobility within one’s purpose in order to select the
proper method of measurement (Burkhauser & Couch, 2008). As Lundberg and Stewart
(2020) assert, “Single-number summaries that capture the relationship of socioeconomic
outcomes across generations are a cornerstone of economic mobility research” (p. 2).
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But whether single or multiple numbers are used, any values involved in a summary
measurement inherently sacrifices information in order to gain parsimony (Lundberg &
Stewart, 2020) and is an “oversimplification” (Bartholomew, 1982, p. 30).
Measurements of mobility are functions that result in ranking mobility outcomes but
trying to account for all aspects of mobility is “destined for failure” (Fields & Ok, 1999a,
p. 560). There are multiple aspects of mobility that may be measured. The most obvious
is movement, which is important with intragenerational mobility. Origin independence is
an idea which applies easily with intergenerational mobility and is often equated with
equality of opportunity. Any measurement of mobility should address one of these
aspects of mobility (Fields & Ok, 1999a). Since “an outcome can be ‘more meritocratic’
without being perfectly meritocratic,” comparing to meritocracy is important
(VannPashak, 2019, p. 1).
There are several important existing measures of mobility (Bartholomew, 1982;
Burkhauser & Couch, 2008; Chakravarty et al., 1985; Fields, 2010; Fields & Ok, 1996,
1999a; Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013; King, 1983; Lundberg & Stewart, 2020; Mishra, 2018;
VannPashak, 2019). Two commonly used, statistical measures of mobility are the
Pearson correlation, r, and the least-squares slope coefficient (elasticity), Beta (β)—
neither of which use mobility transition matrices (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013). Both 1-r and
1- β have been used as mobility indices (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013). Schiller (1977) used
rank-correlation (ρ) as a measure of immobility. Mobility may be measured by 1-ρ.
Cowell and Flachaire (2017) asserted that “elasticity and correlation-based indices are
inadequate to measure income mobility” (p. 2). Fields and Ok proposed several measures
of mobility, including “the per capita aggregate change in log-incomes” (Fields & Ok,
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1999b, p. 455), “the sum of the absolute values of income changes” (Fields & Ok, 1996,
p. 369), the per capita measure of income changes, and the percentage measure of income
changes (Fields & Ok, 1996). None of these measures are related to mobility
tables/transition matrices.
Odds ratios for adjacent rows and columns have been a common method used to
show the positive or negative associations in a mobility table (Hout, 1983). Edwards
(1963) was a proponent of using cross-ratios of matrices to measure association. The
Altham Statistic uses all the cross-ratios of two matrices to measure the distance between
them. While this distance may be calculated between any two same-sized matrices,
typically the second matrix used is that of independence (matrix of all ones) (Long &
Ferrie, 2018). The Altham Statistic is equal to zero in the perfectly mobile situation and
infinity (∞) under complete immobility (Altham and Ferrie, 2007). While the Altham
Statistic measures a quantitative association between two matrices, it does not show
“direction of the association” (Altham and Ferrie, 2007, p. 11). Of course, there are
many different tables that could have the same Altham Statistic value, so comparing
mobility between tables may not be possible in some cases.
Mobility ratios are a method used to show the relationship of actual totals or
frequencies to those “expected under the model of perfect mobility” (Hout, 1983, p. 17).
Since they compare observed quantities to hypothetical values, they do not reflect any
strength of association. A measure of upward mobility is the probability that a child’s
quantile rank exceeds that of their parents’ quantile rank (Torche, 2015). Similarly, a
measure of downward mobility is the probability that a child’s quantile rank ends up
below that of their parents’ quantile rank. Bartholomew (1982) and Scott and Litchfield
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(1994) proposed the Average Absolute Jump Index of mobility. It averages the
individual class boundaries crossed between the origin and destination timeframes
(Mishra, 2018). The normalized Average Jump Index is equal to the Average Absolute
Jump Index divided by n/2 (Mishra, 2018). Formby et al. (2004) used a measure of “the
average number of income classes crossed by all individuals” (Formby et al., 2004, p.
184).
There are other ways of summarizing mobility using mobility matrices
(Bartholomew, 1982; Formby et al., 2004; Hout, 1983; Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013; Mishra,
2018; Scott and Litchfield, 1994; Torche, 2015). Good (1965) “suggested that the
algebraic rank of the matrix” should be part of measuring association (Altham, 1970, p.
66). Immobility Ratios (IRs) “summarise how much clustering there is on (or,
sometimes, also around) the leading diagonal of a transition matrix—and hence
summarize positional change” (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013, p. 55). In addition, a mobility
ratio of 1 – IR may also be used. A simple measure of mobility is using the trace of the
mobility transition matrix. The trace is simply the sum of the main diagonal elements
and indicate the level of stickiness or immobility (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013). Prais (1955)
and Shorrocks (1978) advocated a measure of mobility using the trace of a mobility
transition matrix, referred to as the Normalized Trace (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013). It takes
the form of:
P(M) = [n - trace(M)]/[n - 1],
Where n is the size of the n x n matrix M. P(M) is equal to one in the perfectly mobile
situation and zero under complete immobility (Burkhauser & Couch, 2008; Shorrocks,
1978). It “measures the average probability across all classes that an individual will
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leave her initial class in the succeeding period; it is also interpreted as the normalized
distance…away from the identity matrix I” (Formby et al., 2004, p. 184). Bartholomew
(1982) proposed another measure using the trace of mobility tables and transmission
matrices. It takes the form of:
B(M) = [trace(M) - 1]/[n - 1],
Where n is the size of the n x n matrix M. Opposite of P(M), B(M) is equal to one under
complete immobility and zero in the perfectly mobile situation (Bartholomew, 1982).
Mobility has also been measured by a fraction of the sum of destination entries
found off the principal diagonal compared to the sum of all table entries. This measure is
also equal to one minus the Immobility Ratio (IR) and may be called the Mobility Ratio
(MR). This overall MR may be split into Upward Mobility Ratio (UMR) and Downward
Mobility Ratio (DMR) measures by limiting the sum of the off-diagonal entries to those
above and below the main diagonal (Altham and Ferrie, 2007; Long and Ferrie, 2013).
Rather than using dollar amounts of income or wealth, intragenerational,
intergenerational, and multigenerational transmission may also be measured by
movement up or down the income or wealth ladder of individuals—or across generations.
One way to measure this inequality is to compare the top to the bottom in the form of a
ratio, whether it is by quartile, quintile, decile, or percentile. Another way may be to
compare income and wealth distribution to a reference like a time of greatest equality or
inequality (Keister, 2014; Kim and Tamborini, 2012; McNamee and Miller, 2014).
Modeling the Relationship between Origin and Destination Status
Besides recording the observed values in mobility tables and transition matrices,
researchers create models to predict the cell entries. Linear models typically use least
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squares regression to model the relationship between origin and destination status (Hout,
1983). Most often, logarithms are used to deal with the skewed nature of income and
wealth variables. In this case, all observed values of zero must be discarded, which
biases the results. This is less of a problem if lifetime incomes are used rather than a
single observation (Lundberg & Stewart, 2020). To overcome this problem, authors have
divided the population samples into quantiles and performed additive quantile regression
(Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013; Lundberg & Stewart, 2020). Quasi-Perfect Mobility (QPM)
attempts to model mobility with a two-step process. A proportion is selected for stayers
along the main diagonal and the rest of the population is assigned to destinations
randomly, according to origin independence. Thus, some of the original non-stayers are
randomly assigned along the main diagonal and added to the selected proportion of
stayers (Hout, 1983). The constrained and unconstrained diagonals models are a class of
social distance mobility models and are concerned with the “number of occupational
categories to be crossed” (Hout, 1983, p. 32). There are seven different models
depending on the different available diagonal constraints employed by the analyst (Hout,
1983).
Log-linear models may be expressed as equations for expected frequencies or in
logit form. A logit model of mobility is measured by “the log-odds on a high-status
destination relative to a lower-status destination given a fixed origin status” (Hout, 1983,
p. 34). Chetty et al. (2014) insist that rank-rank specifications provide “a more robust
summary of intergenerational mobility than traditional log-log specifications” (p. 143).
Topological models are structural in nature and deal with mobility through “quasiindependent subsets of cells (‘levels’) in the table” (Hout, 1983, p. 37). They involve
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conditional invariance with “total, row, and column effects” and “only one interaction
parameter” that determine cell mobility/immobility relative to other cells (Hout, 1983, p.
38). Latent variables may also be used if researchers suspect there are unobserved
variables at play in the association between independent observed variables (Hout, 1983).
Saunders (2010) is one of the few authors who have addressed R2 in mobility research.
Most others have simply ignored it. According to Saunders (2010), even a model R2 of
between 0.22 and 0.37 is “fairly weak” and reveals “other factors at work which have
little to do with either social advantage/disadvantage or meritocracy” (pp. 77,78). There
are very few studies, if any, that exceed this weak explanatory power. No matter how
hard researchers try, there will always be measurement error (Chetty et al., 2014; Hout,
1983; Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013; Lundberg & Stewart, 2020; Saunders, 2010).
Measurement Error in Mobility Research
Error is significant in mobility research, estimated to account for “a 15 to 20
percent downward bias in intergenerational association” in occupation (Torche, 2015, p.
40). Measurement error in earnings/income include selection bias (especially the
censored sample), functional form, short term measurement, transitory fluctuations, the
age at which measurement is taken, and life cycle concerns and is exacerbated by using
market-determined outcomes which exclude the welfare of those participating in nonmarket activities (Mitnik et al., 2019; Torche, 2015). In fact, “those without jobs…tend
to be dropped from social mobility studies altogether, or they get subsumed into bigger
categories and their distinctiveness is lost” (Saunders, 2010, p. 8). Authors have worried
that after accounting for parental socioeconomic status, education, occupation, income,
and wealth correlations may be spurious in nature (Killewald et al., 2017). Bias exists
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when samples are restricted to individuals that are linked through validation systems.
Validation systems are less likely to link “those with less education and income, poor
English ability, non-employed, non-citizens, non-participants in government programs,
and minorities” (Bond et al., 2014, p. 3). In addition to measurement errors, there is
considerable random variability in measuring mobility of socioeconomic status. Part of
this randomness is due to luck in the real world even after consideration of underlying
individual intelligence, ability, talent, and effort. In addition, individual decision-making
under similar circumstances is different even for similarly situated people (Clark, 2013).
If luck happens to “be correlated across generations,” additional bias may be the result
(Shea, 2000, p. 157).
Mobility Tables and Transition Matrices
Consideration of measurement error and bias is important in forming mobility
tables and transition matrices (Bond et al., 2014; Clark, 2013; Killewald et al., 2017;
Mitnik et al., 2019; Saunders, 2010; Shea, 2000; Torche, 2015). Altham and Ferrie
(2007) pointed out that “few tools are as useful to the social historian as the humble
contingency table” (p. 3). Otherwise known as mobility tables and transition matrices,
they are “a simple but under-used device” for mobility research (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013,
p. 161). Yet, comparing the mobility shown in these tables and matrices is not
necessarily an easy task (Burkhauser & Couch, 2008). They are cross-classifications of
the values of a variable at two different times and show the movement of subjects
between different categories or classes (Fields & Ok, 1999a; Torche, 2015). In fact,
transition matrices/mobility tables are “a convenient way of providing a simple snapshot
of rank-movements in the sample” but are still a “crude aggregation” (Chen and Cowell,
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2017, p. 206). They convey information about the symmetrical and asymmetrical nature
of mobility in table form and may be intragenerational (within a single generation),
intergenerational (across two generations), or multigenerational (spanning more than two
generations) (Hout, 1983; Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013; Torche, 2015). Transition
matrices/mobility tables allow one to see “where the rigidities might exist along the
earnings distribution” (Mazumder, 2005, p. 91).
Mobility tables show totals of those moving from each origin to every destination,
so that individual cells reflect “the counts of persons that share each combination of
origin and destination” (Hout, 1983, p. 9). “The same categories are used for origin and
destination,” while the chosen categories are displayed in the same order on each axis of
the table (Hout, 1983, p. 9). The main diagonal entries represent the number who end up
right where they started, so were immobile (Burkhauser & Couch, 2008). In empirical
studies there is typically excess immobility—that found over and above what is expected
under assumptions of origin independence—discovered along the diagonal (Hout, 1983
Transition matrices contain the proportions or probabilities of that movement
(Fields & Ok, 1999a; Prais, 1955; Trede, 1998). The row proportions are outflows and
column proportions are inflows (Hout, 1983). Of course, “summarizing a distributional
transformation by a transition matrix usually results in a loss of information” but tend to
be robust within the defined categories, and do not capture any movement within those
categories (Fields & Ok, 1999a, p. 566). Because inequality involves multiple
dimensions, interpreting mobility transition matrices is not necessarily easy (Atkinson &
Bourguignon, 1982; Trede, 1998;). It is important to note that a “perfectly mobile
society,” or perfect mobility, is represented by the rows of percentages being equal
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(Bartholomew, 1982, p. 24; Hout, 1983; Prais, 1955). Saunders (1996) demonstrated that
observed rates of mobility were similar to those expected under a meritocratic society.
This idea of perfect mobility within a meritocracy is a result of the meritocratic
assumptions made within society (Altham and Ferrie, 2007; Atkinson & Bourguignon,
1982; Bartholomew, 1982; Burkhauser & Couch, 2008; Chen and Cowell, 2017; Fields &
Ok, 1999a; Hout, 1983; Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013; Mazumder, 2005; Prais, 1955;
Saunders, 1996, 2010; Torche, 2015; Trede, 1998).
Trends and Patterns of Mobility Found in Past Studies
Research has been divided into studies that outline measures of mobility, establish
estimates of mobility, and look at trends in mobility. Some studies emphasize the lack of
mobility observed and others value the mobility discovered. Song et al. (2020)
discovered trends in mobility between 1850 and 2015 within the US using an
occupational percentile rank mobility measure. They found increasing mobility for
Americans born before 1900 and mostly constant mobility rates since. Rank-rank
correlations began at about 0.17 with the 1830 cohort and were approximately 0.32 in
1980. Net of the structural change “mostly driven by the movement from farm to factory
during industrialization” mobility was flat between 1860 to 1960 (Song et al., 2020, p.
251). Even with the sharp rise in income inequality since 1970, mobility has stayed
relatively stable (Song et al., 2020). Other researchers have found the same lack of
“major changes in intergenerational mobility” (Lee & Solon, 2009, p. 766). “Since the
First World War, relative mobility rates have remained roughly constant, but absolute
mobility has increased dramatically” (Saunders, 2010, p. 106). In fact, each succeeding
generation enjoyed greater upward mobility than the last because of structural changes

28

MERITOCRACY-BASED STICKINESS MEASURE OF SOCIAL MOBILITY
that created “more room at the top” (Saunders, 2010, p. 107). More recently, these
structural changes have subsided and there is much less upward mobility, especially since
“downward mobility is sticky” (Saunders, 2010, p. 109). While “inequality has
increased,” “rank-based mobility has remained stable” even with consistent differences
across geographic areas in the U.S. (Chetty et al., 2014, pp. 141, 145).
Significant non-linearities have been found in mobility research including
“substantial kinks in the distribution” of occupational status (Torche, 2015, p. 40).
Mobility transition matrices have shown “an especially high degree of rigidity at the
bottom and top of the earnings distribution” (Mazumder, 2005, p. 80). Therefore, a
single linear IGE is not a good measure of mobility when there are non-linearities
involved (Mitnik et al., 2019). Adding higher order polynomial terms to regressions,
using spline functions, and utilizing locally weighted or quantile regressions are all
possible ways to deal with this non-linearity. Besides linearity, other functional forms
may be more appropriate. Many studies use logarithmic functions (Killewald et al.,
2017). Another transformation that has been scarcely used is the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation, which “can incorporate zero and negative values, generating a function
that is approximately linear close to zero and approximately logarithmic for large values”
(Killewald et al., 2017, p. 382).
Adermon et al. (2018) calculated correlation of intergenerational wealth outcomes
over four generations in Sweden. They found rank correlations between parents and
children in the range of 0.3 to 0.4 and grandparent-grandchildren between 0.1 to 0.2.
Gifts and bequests made up over half of this correlation and education a quarter. In the
regressions involving wealth, the R2 was not above 0.20 but was often below 0.10
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(Adermon et al., 2018). Another study done in Sweden by Hällsten (2014) even included
first and second cousins. The correlations were found to be relatively low but much
higher for families above the ninety-ninth percentile (Adermon et al., 2018; Hällsten,
2014).
In an analysis of the one-percenters—those with income and wealth above the
ninety-ninth percentile—Keister (2014) found that their household income and wealth are
correlated with coefficients between 0.50 and 0.60. The one-percenter households
accounted for seventeen percent of all income and held more than one-third of net worth
and financial assets. Most of the top one-percenter research has concentrated on
exorbitant Chief Executive Officer (CEO) salaries and has largely ignored wealth and
life-course effects. Keister (2014) used the 2001-2010 Surveys of Consumer Finances
(SCF) even though the SCF is unable to determine either income or wealth at the very
top. In her study, Keister (2014) described the top one percent, next 9 percent, and the
other 90 percent shares of income and wealth for what she calls “income earners” and
“wealth owners” but reports them as household income and household wealth in her
figures (Keister, 2014, pp. 352, 353). This raises the question about individuals versus
households when it comes to measuring income and wealth and may complicate
comparisons with other earners, households, or the total population. She reports that
“members of the one percent are disproportionately male, white, and married” (Keister,
2014, p. 356). But, if income and wealth are being measured at the household level and
about half of the one percenters are married, then approximately one quarter of the
households would include women, which would contradict the reported top one percent
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being 97.8 percent (income) and 95.8 percent (wealth) males (Keister, 2014). The
distinction between measuring individual and household variables is an important one.
While Keister (2014) did not report any new theoretical or empirical work, she
employed the commonly used Gini Coefficient (GC) to describe historical trends in
income and wealth distribution. This measure of inequality is a number between zero
and one that indicates the gap between perfect equality (GC = 0) and actual income or
wealth distribution (Johnson, 2000). Unfortunately, the wealth GC is commonly
calculated by setting negative net worth values to zero, which introduces downward bias
into wealth inequality measurements (Keister, 2014). Of course, income or wealth
equality do not necessarily parallel to mobility or meritocracy. Even though research of
income and wealth inequality has been expanding, there are still gaps in the literature
(Keister, 2014; Johnson, 2000).
Nettles (2003) stated that “Intelligence is the strongest single factor causing class
mobility in contemporary societies that has been identified” (Nettles, 2003, p. 560).
When it comes to occupation, “the direct effect of parental status, once education is
accounted for, is nonzero but relatively minor,” even though “the mediating role of
education varies widely across classes” (Torche, 2015, pp. 39, 41). In addition, parenting
style has been found to be more important to explaining educational and occupational
outcomes than class and income of parents (Saunders, 2010). Socialization is also a “key
factor in boosting life chances for those born into disadvantage” (Saunders, 2010, p. 117).
Charles and Hurst (2003) and Pfeffer and Killewald (2018) used regression
methods to show intergenerational wealth outcomes over two and three generations using
the PSID. They found “substantial intergenerational persistence in wealth” (Charles and
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Hurst, 2003, pp. 1179-1180) and “stark differences in wealth mobility between whites
and African Americans” (Pfeffer and Killewald, 2018, p. 1434). Both studies used a
regression model utilizing prior generation wealth to account for current wealth, ageadjusted for the timing of wealth measurements. They also addressed other explanations
of intergenerational wealth transmission including income, education, marriage, home
ownership, business ownership, asset ownership, and direct transfers. They both
attempted to report inherited or learned family-related variables that account for the
differential wealth of individuals. What is left after the family-related variable
accounting is the wealth derived from non-family-determined variables. This allows the
comparison between family-determined wealth distribution and non-family-determined
wealth provision over generations. Unfortunately, intergenerational wealth in these
studies only explained between eight and sixteen percent of child wealth outcomes. In
addition to regression models resulting in estimates in generational wealth correlations,
both studies showed mobility transition matrices to display transmission of wealth
between generations.
Need for Meritocracy-Based Measures of Mobility
The need for a single measure to describe mobility has been established for some
time. In order to supplement mobility transition matrices, “it is also important to
construct a single aggregate mobility index which summarizes the direction and
magnitude of…mobility” (Mishra, 2018, p. 276). Cowell and Flachaire (2017) admitted
that “it is not so easy to compare two matrices with many different values” (p. 29).
Determining from mobility transition matrices “whether there is a large or small amount
of mobility” is not “straightforward” (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013, p. 28). A single measure
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of mobility summarizing a mobility transition matrix also helps in determining if mobility
increases or decreases (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013). Altham (1970) outlined the
convenience of “a single expression for the measure of association” rather than multiple
summaries or complete matrices (p. 66). These single measures of mobility allow easy
comparisons “across time or countries in order to say whether mobility is greater or
smaller” (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013, p. 2).
Several authors have outlined the reasons we need to measure where a society
stands compared to an ideal meritocracy. Prais (1955) compared his measure of the
average time spent in a particular social class to the time expected in a “perfectly mobile
society” by taking a ratio of the two (pp. 59-60). In addition, “one can judge the present
imperfection of a particular society” with a meritocratically-comparable measurement
(Allen, 2011, p. 368). In addition, Allen (2011) indicated that measuring mobility in
meritocratic terms can indicate progress of different societies across geography and time.
He also felt that a measurement involving meritocracy may be used as a proxy for
corruption. Solon (2017) outlined the need for a meritocracy-based measure when he
stated, “most people would like to know where our own society lies between the
extremes” (p. 3). In addition, relating to “a perfectly meritocratic society” would “enable
us to compare the reality with the ‘perfect’ model to gauge the extent to which the reality
falls short of the ideal” (Saunders, 2010, p. 60). Without meritocracy-based
measurement, there is disagreement about how “far from the perfect mobility of society”
we are (Solon, 2017, p. 4). Because the idea of meritocracy and the SAD thesis are
diametrically opposed, an objective measure that shows exactly where a society falls
between a perfect meritocracy (shown by origin independence) and a perfect non-
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meritocracy (shown by complete immobility) is needed (Saunders, 2010). Because
researchers have found “a clustering of observations along the main diagonal,” a
stickiness measure of mobility related to meritocracy assumptions makes sense (Altham
and Ferrie, 2007, p. 11). Besides meritocracy in mobility measurement being important,
there have been different methods employed (Allen, 2011).
Economists and sociologists have used class, education, occupation, consumption,
income, and wealth in order to estimate social mobility across generations. In fact, “there
is a continuing debate about whether the rate of intergenerational social mobility has
remained stagnant or declined in the past fifty years, but few think it has increased” and
this immobility has been identified as an important western political problem which
needs addressed (Young, 2015, p. 9). This political problem has been perceived as
serious even though inequality may not have been on individuals’ minds because “even
as inequality worsens most people have tended to fare better” (Keister, 2014, p. 363). The
assumption is that “societies can’t possibly be meritocratic because of the low levels of
social mobility” (Young, 2015, p. 11). But even if this assumption is true, it may only
indicate a lack of meritocracy in the distribution of inborn talents (Young, 2015). This
perception that immobility is a serious problem and is to blame for current social ills
must still be tested. It is possible that society, including economists and sociologists are
blaming the wrong thing. The common perception is that all democracies are far from
being meritocracies (Young, 2015). One way to support or refute this common
perception is to create an MBSMoM that shows where a society lies between
assumptions of FM and LM. Besides this individual position of society, an MBSMoM
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will be able to compare class, education, occupation, consumption, income, and wealth
mobility over time, geography, and among subpopulations (Keister, 2014; Young, 2015).
Gathering data on income and wealth in the US is a relatively new enterprise,
starting in the 1950s (income) and 1980s (wealth) except for the 1962 Survey of the
Financial Characteristics of Consumers (SFCC) which measured both. Other sources of
income and wealth data include the US Census, the Social Security Administration
(SSA), Current Population Survey (CPS), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), Statistics of Income (SOI), Occupational Change in a Generation
Survey (OCGS), Federal Income Tax data, and Estate Tax data. In addition, cross
national data has been harmonized in the Cross-National Equivalence File (CNEF). The
PSID is the ideal dataset because it is “the world’s longest running national household
panel survey, collecting data since 1968 from the same families and their descendants”
(Smeeding, 2018, p. 29). In order to measure how close a society is to meritocracy, there
must exist mobility information (Auten et al., 2013; Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013; Keister,
2014; Long and Ferrie, 2013; Mazumder, 2014; Smeeding, 2018).
This research takes several steps. The first is: develop an SSMoM and WSMoM
which may be used with intragenerational, intergenerational, and multigenerational
mobility transition matrices. The second is: calculate SSMoM and WSMoM values using
real-world transition matrices, and transition matrices under assumptions of FM and its
opposite, LM. The third step is: take real-world values of the SSMoM and WSMoM and
their values in FM and LM to create an MBSMoM.
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III. DATA AND METHODS
Data
Jäntti and Jenkins (2013) recognized that “different data sources and estimation
methods may generate different results” (p. 170). Dardanoni et al. (2008) claimed that
“there is no compelling reason to use three categories rather than two, four or any other
number” (p. 13). Others have disagreed, pointing out that the number of categories leads
to different results. For example, “the transition-matrix approach could be sensitive to
the merging or splitting of classes or the adjustment of class boundaries” (Cowell and
Flachaire, 2017, p. 14). The amount of measured mobility “heavily depends on the
number of…groups, or is sensitive to the choice of the range over which movement (i.e.,
quintiles, deciles, and so on) is measured” (Mishra, 2018, p. 277). These differences may
even be driven by the mobility variable chosen—education, occupation, SES, class,
consumption, income, or wealth (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013). Results can vary widely by
class, education, occupation, consumption, income, and wealth mobility studies (Torche,
2015). Intragenerational, intergenerational, and multigenerational mobility and
mechanisms differ by geography, structural institutions, governments, population
subgroups and socioeconomic status, not to mention differences in results from research
assumptions, approaches, and methods (Pfeffer, 2014). Mobility research “has produced
wildly divergent estimates” (Lee & Solon, 2009, p. 766). When it comes to earnings,
measures “over short periods of time may contain a large ‘transitory’ component” and
cannot represent permanent or lifetime income (Mazumder, 2005, p. 81). These
transitory shocks have been found to fluctuate over the life cycle, which have resulted in
large variations in mobility estimates (Cowell and Flachaire, 2017; Dardanoni et al.,
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2008; Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013; Lee & Solon, 2009; Mazumder, 2005; Mishra, 2018;
Pfeffer, 2014; Torche, 2015).
Methods
The current study uses the MBSMoM in evaluating the results of 22 studies using
92 mobility transition matrices with sample sizes ranging from 799 to 43,701. Appendix
Table 1(a) shows a mobility transition matrix under assumptions for an imaginary LM
(perfect non-meritocracy), which represents perfect rigidity or complete immobility,
indicated by all 100 percent entries in the main diagonal and zeros in all off-diagonal
cells of the table (Burkhauser & Couch, 2008; Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013). Appendix Table
1(b) represents the mobility transition outcomes in an imaginary FM (optimal
meritocracy), representing origin independence or perfect mobility, assuming randomly
distributed natural talent represented by a lack of systemic relationship between origins
and destinations (Burkhauser & Couch, 2008; Jäntti and Jenkins, 2013). Perfect mobility
means “there is no connection between the children’s origins and where they will end up”
(Solon, 2017, p. 3). This optimal meritocracy is the opposite of the perfect nonmeritocracy shown in Appendix Table 1(a) (Saunders, 2010). However, actual transition
matrices almost always lie somewhere between those represented by Appendix Table
1(a) and 1(b) (Bartholomew, 1982). As an illustration, Appendix Table 1(c) presents the
wealth mobility results from Charles and Hurst (2003).
I first created two Stickiness Measures of Mobility (SMoMs) which may be used
with intragenerational, intergenerational, and multigenerational mobility transition
matrices, and applicable to multiple diverse studies. These different ways to measure
mobility may be used with data of class, education, occupation, consumption, income,
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and wealth contained in mobility transition matrices. These SMoMs may be calculated
and compared with their values of an ideal FM (“perfect mobility”) and its opposite, an
LM (perfect immobility) (Saunders, 2010, p. 10). Because stickiness of class, education,
occupation, consumption, income, and wealth may be important, these SMoMs bay be
used to form an MBSMoM (Charles and Hurst, 2003; Pfeffer and Killewald, 2018;
Saunders, 2010).
The SMoMs concentrate on the stickiness of class, education, occupation,
consumption, income, and wealth within and across generations. They reflect a measure
of the probabilities of remaining in the same category or quantile (quartile, quintile,
decile, or percentile) taken across all categories of the mobility transition matrix. The
objective was to transform commonly used mobility transition matrices into a Simple
Stickiness Measure of Mobility (SSMoM) and/or a Weighted Stickiness Measure of
Mobility (WSMoM) and then a Meritocracy-Based Stickiness Measure of Mobility
(MBSMoM), using comparisons of these real-world SMoMs with SMoMs associated
with FM and LM assumptions.
Mobility transition matrices consist of n by n matrices of numbers representing
the proportions of individuals who begin a time period in the ith category or quantile
(quartile, quintile, decile, or percentile) and end the time period in the jth category or
quantile (quartile, quintile, decile, or percentile). For quartiles, n is equal to 4. For
quintiles, n is equal to 5. Obviously, n is equal to 10 for deciles and 100 when using
percentiles. Since this research deals with stickiness, only the principal diagonal of the
mobility transition matrices matter because they represent those who begin and end in the
same position. This limits the analysis to those entries with i equal to j.
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A mobility matrix M has individual entries mij where i represents the row number
and j represents the column number:

m11
m21
m31
m41
m51

m12
m22
m32
m42
m52

m13
m23
m33
m43
m53

m14
m24
m34
m44
m54

m15
m25
m35
m45
m55

For example, the mobility matrix M calculated by Charles and Hurst (2003) is:

36
26
16
15
11

29
24
21
13
16

16
24
25
20
14

12
15
24
26
24

7
12
15
26
36

Stickiness measures of mobility are only concerned with the principal diagonal of the
mobility matrix M, so taking the diagonal, DM, of mobility matrix, M, results in the
matrix (Horst, 1963):

m11
0
0
0
0

0
m22
0
0
0

0
0
m33
0
0

0
0
0
m44
0

0
0
0
0
m55

The diagonal, DM, of mobility matrix, M, may also be calculated by taking the
“Hadamard-Schur” Product (HSP) (multiplying each individual element of two samesize matrices, aij and bij with each other to form a resultant matrix the same size as those
being multiplied) of the matrix, M, and a matrix with all ones along the principal
diagonal and zeros elsewhere (Rao and Rao, 1998):
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1
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
1

m11
m21
m31
m41
m51

m12
m22
m32
m42
m52

m13
m23
m33
m43
m53

m14
m24
m34
m44
m54

m15
m25
m35
m45
m55

For example, the diagonal, DM, of mobility matrix M calculated by Charles and Hurst
(2003) is:

36
0
0
0
0

0
24
0
0
0

0
0
25
0
0

0
0
0
26
0

0
0
0
0
36

A Simple Stickiness Measure of Mobility (SSMoM) may be calculated as an
average mobility rate by taking the trace of the diagonal of the mobility matrix, M,
trace(DM), and dividing it by n. The trace(DM), is calculated by pre-multiplying and postmultiplying DM, by vectors consisting of all ones (Horst, 1963):
1

1

1

1

1

m11
0
0
0
0

0
m22
0
0
0

0
0
m33
0
0

0
0
0
m44
0

0
0
0
0
m55

1
1
1
1
1

trace(DM) = m11 + m22 + m33 + m44 + m55
For example, the Simple Stickiness Measure of Mobility (SSMoM) consisting of the
trace(DM) divided by n calculated for the transition matrix of Charles and Hurst (2003) is:

1

1

1

1

1

36
0
0
0
0

0
24
0
0
0

0
0
25
0
0

0
0
0
26
0

SSMoM = trace(DM)/n = (36 + 24 + 25 + 26 + 36)/5 = 147/5 = 29.40
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A Weighted Stickiness Measure of Mobility (WSMoM) may be calculated by premultiplying DM by a set of weights, post-multiplying by a vector of ones, dividing by n,
then dividing by the average weight (weight vector multiplied by a vector of ones divided
by n):
WSMoM = (WDM1/n)/(W1/n)
Where WDM1 =
w1

w2

w3

w4

w5

m11
0
0
0
0

0
m22
0
0
0

0
0
m33
0
0

0
0
0
m44
0

0
0
0
0
m55

1
1
1
1
1

WDM1 = w1m11 + w2m22 + w3m33 + w4m44 + w5m55
And W1 =

w1

w2

w3

w4

w5

1
1
1
1
1

W1 = w1 + w2 + w3 + w4 + w5
Therefore, WSMoM =
[(w1m11+w2m22+w3m33+w4m44+w5m55)/n]/((w1+w2+w3+w4+w5)/n)
For example, a WSMoM using declining weights of 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, of the mobility matrix
calculated for the transition matrix of Charles and Hurst (2003) is:
WSMoM = (WDM1/n)/(W1/n)
Where WDM1 =
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5

4

3

2

1

36
0
0
0
0

0
24
0
0
0

0
0
25
0
0

0
0
0
26
0

0
0
0
0
36

1
1
1
1
1

WDM1/n = [5(36) + 4(24) + 3(25) + 2(26) + 1(36)]/5 = 439/5 = 87.8
And W1 =

5

4

3

2

1

1
1
1
1
1

W1 = 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 15
So WSMoM = (WDM1/n)/(W1/n) = (439/5)/(15/5) = 87.8/3 = 29.27
The SSMoM and WSMoM values calculated from mobility transition matrices
will be compared with those calculated under hypothetical outcomes under FM and LM
assumptions to gage where in the spectrum they lay. For example, an SSMoM of LM,
SSMoMLM, assumes that there is a 100 percent chance of remaining in the quantile in
which one is born and, for the 5X5 matrix shown in Appendix Table 1(a), may be
calculated as (Saunders, 2010):
1

1

1

1

1

100
0
0
0
0

0
100
0
0
0

0
0
100
0
0

0
0
0
100
0

0
0
0
0
100

1
1
1
1
1

SSMoMLM = (100 + 100 + 100 + 100 + 100)/5 = 100
In addition, an SSMoM of FM, SSMoMFM, assumes that there is equal chance to move
from each quantile to any other quantile, and, for the 5X5 matrix shown in Appendix
Table 1(b), may be calculated as (Saunders, 2010):
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1

1

1

1

1

20
0
0
0
0

0
20
0
0
0

0
0
20
0
0

0
0
0
20
0

0
0
0
0
20

1
1
1
1
1

SSMoMFM = trace(DM)/n = (20 + 20 + 20 + 20 + 20)/5 = 20
Since the values in the principal diagonal of each mobility matrix, M, associated with FM
and LM assumptions are equal, the WSMoM for each will have the same value of 100
and 20 respectively, no matter the weights chosen.
A Meritocracy-Based Stickiness Measure of Mobility (MBSMoM) is calculated
by taking an SSMoM (or WSMoM) and computing a percentage between its values of
SSMoMFM (or WSMoMFM) and SSMoMLM (or WSMoMLM):
MBSMoMS = (SSMoM - SSMoMFM)/(SSMoMLM - SSMoMFM)
MBSMoMW = (WSMoM - WSMoMFM)/(WSMoMLM - WSMoMFM)
For example, the MBSMoMs calculated for the transition matrix of Charles and Hurst
(2003) in Appendix Table 1(c) are:
MBSMoMS = (SSMoM - SSMoMFM)/(SSMoMLM - SSMoMFM)
MBSMoMS = (29.40 - 20)/(100 - 20) = 9.40/0.80 = 11.75
MBSMoMW = (WSMoM - WSMoMFM)/(WSMoMLM - WSMoMFM)
MBSMoMW = (29.27 - 20)/(100 - 20) = 9.27/0.80 = 11.59
The MBSMoMS value of 11.75 indicates that the real-world observation of mobility
using the SSMoM = 29.40, from the mobility table in Charles and Hurst (2003), is
11.75% away from the value under assumptions of FM. Using the WSMoM = 29.27,
mobility lies 11.59% between the values under assumptions of FM and LM.
The MBSMoM may be interpreted as a measure of mobility that is the percentage
between the hypothetical mobility table associated with assumptions of FM and the
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hypothetical mobility table associated with assumptions of LM. In this sense, every
MBSMoM conveys information by itself, in addition to allowing comparisons with other
MBSMoM calculations. Many existing measures of mobility convey no information by
themselves because they may only be used in comparison with other values. Because of
the stickiness expectation of class, occupation, income, and wealth mobility, the values of
real world calculated SMoMs should have a minimum of 1/n (associated with FM) and
may not exceed the value of 1 (associated with LM). With a minimum of 1/n and
maximum of 1, actual values of Stickiness SMoMs will fall somewhere in between.
Since MBSMoMs are calculated as a percentage, they will range in value between 0 and
1. I selected the mobility studies I found that included mobility matrices.

IV. FINDINGS
The overall results are contained in Appendix Table 2. This table shows the
source of each mobility transition matrix evaluated in this study, along with basic
information about the sample used and the calculated value of the MBSMoM. First, I
will describe the individual results and then make some generalizations about the trends
and patterns of mobility based on observations. Authors from 22 studies created 92
mobility transition matrices with sample sizes ranging from 799 to 43,701.
Calculated Values of the MBSMoM
Charles and Hurst (2003)
Charles and Hurst (2003) used the PSID to evaluate relative family wealth
mobility in the US. They evaluated 1,491 parent/child pairs in the US using quintiles to
measure age-adjusted family wealth of parents in 1984-1989 and their children in 1999.
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This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1154, meaning that
mobility was 11.54 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Charles and
Hurst (2003) also controlled for lifetime income and asset composition to evaluate the
1,491 parent/child pairs in the US using quintiles to measure age-adjusted family wealth
of parents in 1984-1989 and their children in 1999. This mobility transition matrix
resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0126, meaning that mobility was 1.26 percent away
from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Pfeffer and Killewald (2018)
Pfeffer and Killewald (2018) used the PSID to evaluate relative family wealth
mobility in the US. They evaluated 2,001 parent/child pairs in the US using quintiles to
measure intergenerational family wealth of parents in 1984 and their children in 2013.
This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1494, meaning that
mobility was 14.94 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Jäntti and Jenkins (2013)
Jäntti and Jenkins (2013) used the PSID to evaluate relative mobility in
intragenerational family income in the US. In order to investigate the effect of the
number of divisions (categories or quantiles) chosen for analysis, I repeated the work of
Jäntti and Jenkins (2013) with half the quantiles they chose to use. They evaluated
income using deciles to measure intragenerational income of families between 1979 and
1988. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1213, meaning
that mobility was 12.13 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. I reassessed the Jäntti and Jenkins (2013) family income in the US by dividing their deciles
into quintiles by combining deciles 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8, and 9 and 10, to
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measure family income between 1979 and their sons in 1988. This mobility transition
matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2206, meaning that mobility was 22.06
percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. This is almost double (1.82
times) the value obtained using deciles with the same data.
Jäntti and Jenkins (2013) evaluated income using deciles to measure
intragenerational income of families between 1989 and 1998. This mobility transition
matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1444, meaning that mobility was 14.44
percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. I also re-assessed the Jäntti and
Jenkins (2013) family income in the US by dividing their deciles into quintiles by
combining deciles 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8, and 9 and 10, to measure family
income between 1989 and their sons in 1998. This mobility transition matrix resulted in
an MBSMoM value of 0.2580, meaning that mobility was 25.8 percent away from the
mobility under FM assumptions. This is almost double (1.79 times) the value obtained
using deciles with the same data.
Mazumder (2005)
Mazumder (2005) used SIPP and SSA data to evaluate relative intergenerational
income mobility in the US for fathers and sons. In order to investigate the effect of the
number of divisions (categories or quantiles) chosen for analysis, I repeated the work of
Mazumder (2005) with half the quantiles they chose to use. They evaluated father/son
pairs using deciles to measure relative intergenerational income mobility of fathers in
1985 and their sons in 1998. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM
value of 0.0721, meaning that mobility was 7.21 percent away from the mobility under
FM assumptions. I re-assessed the Mazumder (2005) father/son pairs in the US by
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dividing their deciles into quintiles by combining deciles 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and
8, and 9 and 10, to measure income of fathers in 1985 and their sons in 1998. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1160, meaning that
mobility was 11.6 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. This is 1.61
times the value obtained using deciles with the same data.
Mazumder (2005) evaluated father/son pairs using quartiles to measure relative
intergenerational income mobility of fathers in 1985 and their sons in 1998. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1196, meaning that
mobility was 11.96 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. This is like
using quintiles and 1.66 times the value obtained using deciles with the same data.
Corak and Heisz (1999)
Corak and Heisz (1999) used tax data to evaluate relative income mobility in
Canada for fathers and sons. In order to investigate the effect of the number of divisions
(categories or quantiles) chosen for analysis, I repeated the work of Corak and Heisz
(1999) with half the quantiles they chose to use. They evaluated father/son pairs in
Canada and used deciles to measure income of fathers in 1982 and their sons in 1995.
This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0306, meaning that
mobility was 3.06 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. I re-assessed
the Corak and Heisz (1999) father/son pairs in Canada by dividing their deciles into
quintiles by combining deciles 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8, and 9 and 10, to
measure income of fathers in 1982 and their sons in 1995. This mobility transition matrix
resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0589, meaning that mobility was 5.89 percent away
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from the mobility under FM assumptions. This is almost twice (1.92 times) the value
obtained using deciles with the same data.
Cowell and Flachaire (2017)
Cowell and Flachaire (2017) used the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)
to evaluate relative intragenerational household income mobility in China. They used
quintiles to measure intragenerational household income mobility between 1989 and
2000. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0789, meaning
that mobility was 7.89 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Cowell
and Flachaire (2017) also used quintiles to measure intragenerational household income
mobility between 2000 and 2011. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an
MBSMoM value of 0.1127, so mobility was 11.27 percent away from FM assumptions.
Chen and Cowell (2017)
Chen and Cowell (2017) used the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) to
evaluate relative intragenerational mobility of household income throughout all of China,
rural China, and urban China. They started with long-term mobility of a 12-year time
span. Chen and Cowell (2017) evaluated 2,843 households in China and used quintiles to
measure intragenerational mobility of household income between 1989 and 2000. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0789, meaning that
mobility was 7.89 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Chen and
Cowell (2017) also evaluated 2,600 households in China and used quintiles to measure
intragenerational mobility of household income between 2000 and 2011. This mobility
transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1127, meaning that mobility was
11.27 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
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Chen and Cowell (2017) evaluated rural households in China and used quintiles to
measure intragenerational mobility of household income between 1989 and 2000. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0565, meaning that
mobility was 5.65 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions in rural China.
Chen and Cowell (2017) also evaluated rural households in China and used quintiles to
measure intragenerational mobility of household income between 2000 and 2011. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0834, meaning that
mobility was 8.34 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions in rural China.
Chen and Cowell (2017) evaluated urban households in China and used quintiles
to measure intragenerational mobility of household income between 1989 and 2000. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0938, meaning that in
urban China mobility was 9.38 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Chen and Cowell (2017) also evaluated urban households in China and used quintiles to
measure intragenerational mobility of household income between 2000 and 2011. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1613, meaning that in
urban China mobility was 16.13 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
In addition, Chen and Cowell (2017) evaluated short-term intragenerational
income mobility by dividing the 12 years of data into 3-year time spans. They evaluated
3,600 households in China and used quintiles to measure intragenerational mobility of
household income between 1989 and 1991. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an
MBSMoM value of 0.1882, meaning that mobility was 18.82 percent away from the
mobility under FM assumptions. Chen and Cowell (2017) evaluated 3,358 households in
China and used quintiles to measure intragenerational mobility of household income
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between 1991 and 1993. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value
of 0.1768, meaning that mobility was 17.68 percent away from the mobility under FM
assumptions. Chen and Cowell (2017) evaluated 3,400 households in China and used
quintiles to measure intragenerational mobility of household income between 2004 and
2006. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2061, meaning
that mobility was 20.61 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Chen
and Cowell (2017) evaluated 3,442 households in China and used quintiles to measure
intragenerational mobility of household income between 2009 and 2011. This mobility
transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2239, meaning that mobility was
22.39 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Formby et. al. (2004)
Formby et. al. (2004) used data from the PSID and the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSEOP) to evaluate both absolute and relative individual intragenerational
mobility of earnings in the US and Germany. They evaluated 5,000 individuals in the
US using quintiles to measure relative individual intragenerational earnings between
1985 and 1990. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of
0.3670, meaning that mobility was 36.7 percent away from the mobility under FM
assumptions. Formby et. al. (2004) also evaluated 6,000 individuals in Germany using
quintiles to measure relative individual intragenerational earnings between 1985 and
1990. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.4131, meaning
that mobility was 41.31 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Formby et. al. (2004) evaluated 5,000 individuals in the US using quintiles to
measure absolute individual intragenerational earnings between 1985 and 1990. This
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mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.3839, meaning that
mobility was 38.39 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Formby et.
al. (2004) also evaluated 6,000 individuals in Germany using quintiles to measure
absolute individual intragenerational earnings between 1985 and 1990. This mobility
transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.5086, meaning that mobility was
50,86 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Mishra (2018)
Mishra (2018) used the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) to evaluate
relative intragenerational mobility of household income throughout all India, rural India,
and urban India. They evaluated 40,018 households in India and used quintiles to
measure intragenerational income of households between 2005 and 2012. This mobility
transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1543, meaning that mobility was
15.43 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Mishra (2018)
evaluated rural households in India and used quintiles to measure intragenerational
income of households between 2005 and 2012. This mobility transition matrix resulted
in an MBSMoM value of 0.1275, meaning that mobility was 12.75 percent away from the
mobility under FM assumptions. Mishra (2018) also evaluated urban households in India
using quintiles to measure intragenerational income of households between 2005 and
2012. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1525, meaning
that mobility was 15.25 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Long and Ferrie (2018)
Long and Ferrie (2018) used Census data to evaluate absolute mobility in
occupations in the US and Britain for different combinations of grandfathers, fathers and
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sons. Long and Ferrie (2018) evaluated 4,943 father/son pairs in Britain and used four
categories to measure occupations of fathers in 1851 and their sons in 1881. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.3204, meaning that
mobility was 32.04 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Long and
Ferrie (2018) also evaluated 4,887 father/son pairs in Britain and used four categories to
measure occupations of fathers in 1881 and their sons in 1911. This mobility transition
matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2424, meaning that mobility was 24.24
percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. In addition, Long and Ferrie
(2018) evaluated 4,002 grandfather/grandson pairs in Britain and used four categories to
measure occupations of grandfathers in 1851 and their grandsons in 1911. This mobility
transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1113, meaning that mobility was
11.13 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Long and Ferrie (2018) evaluated 43,701 father/son pairs in the US and used four
categories to measure occupations of fathers in 1850 and their sons in 1880. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2418, meaning that
mobility was 24.18 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Long and
Ferrie (2018) also evaluated 43,701 father/son pairs in the US and used four categories to
measure occupations of fathers in 1880 and their sons in 1910. This mobility transition
matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2776, meaning that mobility was 27.76
percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. In addition, Long and Ferrie
(2018) evaluated 43,701 grandfather /grandson pairs in the US and used four categories
to measure occupations of fathers in 1850 and their grandsons in 1910. This mobility
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transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1421, meaning that mobility was
14.21 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Long and Ferrie (2018) evaluated 1,983 father/son pairs in Britain and used four
categories to measure occupations of fathers in 1881 and their sons in 1911 for fathers
who ended up in an occupation equal to that of the grandfather. This mobility transition
matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2227, meaning that mobility was 22.27
percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Long and Ferrie (2018) also
evaluated 1,043 father/son pairs in Britain and used four categories to measure
occupations of fathers in 1881 and their sons in 1911 for fathers who ended up in an
occupation higher to that of the grandfather. This mobility transition matrix resulted in
an MBSMoM value of 0.0601, so mobility was 6.01 percent away from the mobility
under FM assumptions. In addition, Long and Ferrie (2018) evaluated 948 father/son
pairs in Britain and used four categories to measure occupations of fathers in 1881 and
their sons in 1911 for fathers who ended up in an occupation lower than that of the
grandfather. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1198,
meaning that mobility was 11.98 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Altham and Ferrie (2007)
Altham and Ferrie (2007) used Census data to evaluate absolute intergenerational
mobility in occupations in the US for fathers and sons. They evaluated 8,999 father/son
pairs and used four categories to measure occupations of fathers in 1850 and their sons in
1880. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2045, meaning
that mobility was 20.45 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Altham
and Ferrie (2007) also evaluated 17,733 father/son pairs using four categories to measure
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occupations of fathers in 1880 and their sons in 1910. This mobility transition matrix
resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1875, meaning that mobility was 18.75 percent away
from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Neidhöfer and Stockhausen (2019)
Neidhöfer and Stockhausen (2019) used the GSEOP, PSID, and British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) from the Cross-National Equivalent File to evaluate
absolute multigenerational mobility of education in Germany, the US, and Britain for
grandparents and grandchildren. They evaluated 1,890 German grandparents/
grandchildren pairs from the GSEOP and used three categories to measure education
levels of grandparents and their grandchildren between 1960 and 1985. This mobility
transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1698, meaning that mobility was
16.98 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Neidhöfer and
Stockhausen (2019) also evaluated 5,554 US grandparents/ grandchildren pairs from the
PSID using three categories to measure education levels of grandparents and their
grandchildren between 1960 and 1985. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an
MBSMoM value of 0.1020, meaning that mobility was 10.2 percent away from the
mobility under FM assumptions. In addition, Neidhöfer and Stockhausen (2019)
evaluated 5,554 British grandparents/ grandchildren pairs from the BHPS using three
categories to measure education levels of grandparents and their grandchildren between
1960 and 1985. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of
0.0350, meaning that mobility was 3.5 percent away from FM assumptions mobility.
Long and Ferrie (2013)
Long and Ferrie (2013) used the Oxford Mobility Study (OMS), Occupational Change in
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a Generation Survey (OCGS), and Census data to evaluate absolute mobility in
occupations in Britain and the US for fathers and sons. They evaluated 1,123 father/son
pairs from the OMS in Britain and used four categories to measure occupations of fathers
in 1949 and their sons in 1972. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM
value of 0.2015, meaning that mobility was 20.15 percent away from the mobility under
FM assumptions. Long and Ferrie (2013) evaluated 2,988 US father/son pairs from
OCGS data using four categories to measure occupations of fathers in 1955 and their sons
in 1973. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1493,
meaning that mobility was 14.93 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Long and Ferrie (2013) evaluated 3,076 British father/son pairs from British
Census data using four categories to measure occupations of fathers in 1851 and their
sons in 1881. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.3090,
meaning that mobility was 30.9 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Long and Ferrie (2013) evaluated 2,005 US father/son pairs from US Census data using
four categories to measure occupations of fathers in 1850 and their sons in 1880. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0. 0.2161, meaning that
mobility was 21.61 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Long and
Ferrie (2013) also evaluated 2,632 US father/son pairs from US Census data using four
categories to measure occupations of fathers in 1860 and their sons in 1880. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0. 0.2222, meaning that
mobility was 22.22 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. In addition,
Long and Ferrie (2013) evaluated 2,499 US father/son pairs from US Census data using
four categories to measure occupations of fathers in 1880 and their sons in 1900. This
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mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0. 0.2664, meaning that
mobility was 26.64 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Goodman (1965; 1969)
Goodman (1965; 1969) evaluated absolute mobility in occupations in Britain and
Denmark for fathers and sons. He evaluated 2,391 father/son pairs in Denmark and used
three categories to measure intergenerational occupational mobility of fathers and their
sons. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2720, meaning
that mobility was 27.2 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Goodman
(1965; 1969) also evaluated 3,497 father/son pairs in Britain using three categories to
measure intergenerational occupational mobility of fathers and their sons. This mobility
transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2371, meaning that mobility was
23.71 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. In addition, Goodman
(1965; 1969) evaluated the same 3,497 father/son pairs in Britain using five categories to
measure intergenerational occupational mobility of fathers and their sons. This mobility
transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1868, meaning that mobility was
18.68 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Using the same data, the
calculated MBSMoM with three categories is 1.27 times the value using five categories.
Pfeffer and Killewald (2015)
Pfeffer and Killewald (2015) used the PSID to evaluate relative intergenerational
wealth mobility in the US for parents and their children. They evaluated 1,975
parent/child pairs in the US and used quintiles to measure intergenerational wealth
mobility of parents in 1984 and their children in 2013. This mobility transition matrix
resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1386, meaning that mobility was 13.86 percent away
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from the mobility under FM assumptions. Pfeffer and Killewald (2015) also evaluated
1,105 White parent/child pairs in the US and used three quantiles to measure
intergenerational wealth mobility of parents in 1984 and their children in 2013. This
mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2243, meaning that
mobility was 22.43 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. In addition,
Pfeffer and Killewald (2015) evaluated 799 Black parent/child pairs in the US and used
three quantiles to measure intergenerational wealth mobility of parents in 1984 and their
children in 2013. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of
0.0669, meaning that mobility was 6.69 percent away from the mobility under FM
assumptions.
Pfeffer and Killewald (2015) also investigated home ownership as a proxy for
wealth. They evaluated 1,428 White grandparent/grandchildren pairs in the US and used
two categories to measure multigenerational home ownership mobility of grandparents in
1984 and their grandchildren in 2013. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an
MBSMoM value of 0.0750, meaning that mobility was 7.5 percent away from the
mobility under FM assumptions. Pfeffer and Killewald (2015) also evaluated 942 Black
grandparent/grandchildren pairs in the US and used two categories to measure
multigenerational home ownership mobility of grandparents in 1984 and their
grandchildren in 2013. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of
0.0690, meaning that mobility was 6.9 percent away from the mobility under FM
assumptions.
Mazumder (2014)
Mazumder (2014) used the SIPP and SSA data to evaluate relative
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intergenerational income mobility in the US for parents and sons. They evaluated 14,757
White parent/son pairs in the US and used quintiles to measure intergenerational income
mobility of parents in 1986 and their sons in 2007. This mobility transition matrix
resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0881, meaning that mobility was 8.81 percent away
from the mobility under FM assumptions. Mazumder (2014) also evaluated 2,025 Black
parent/son pairs in the US and used quintiles to measure intergenerational income
mobility of parents in 1986 and their sons in 2007. This mobility transition matrix
resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0860, meaning that mobility was 8.6 percent away
from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Charles et. al. (2014)
Charles et. al. (2014) used the PSID to evaluate relative intergenerational
expenditure mobility in the US for parents and children. They evaluated 3,000
parent/child pairs in the US and used quartiles to measure intergenerational expenditure
mobility of parents and their children in 2009. This mobility transition matrix resulted in
an MBSMoM value of 0.1324, meaning that mobility was 13.24 percent away from the
mobility under FM assumptions. Charles et. al. (2014) evaluated 3,000 parent/child pairs
in the US and used quartiles to measure intergenerational income mobility of parents and
their children in 2009. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of
0.1633, meaning that mobility was 16.33 percent away from the mobility under FM
assumptions.
Long (2013)
Long (2013) used Census data to evaluate absolute mobility in occupations in
Britain for individual fathers and sons. They evaluated 12,516 father/son pairs in Britain
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and used five categories to measure occupations of fathers in 1851 and their sons in 1881.
This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2413, meaning that
mobility was 24.13 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Long (2013)
also evaluated 4,071 father/son pairs in Britain and used five categories to measure
occupations of fathers in 1881 and their sons in 1901. This mobility transition matrix
resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2007, meaning that mobility was 20.07 percent away
from the mobility under FM assumptions. In addition, Long (2013) evaluated 7,749
individuals in Britain and used five categories to measure intragenerational occupational
mobility between 1851 and 1881. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an
MBSMoM value of 0.3942, meaning that mobility was 39.42 percent away from the
mobility under FM assumptions.
Long (2013) evaluated 12,516 father/son pairs in Britain and used nine categories
to measure occupations of fathers in 1851 and their sons in 1881. This mobility transition
matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.2369, meaning that mobility was 23.69
percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Long (2013) evaluated the same
12,516 father/son pairs in Britain using five categories to measure occupations of fathers
in 1851 and their sons in 1881. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM
value of 0.2615, meaning that mobility was 26.15 percent away from the mobility under
FM assumptions. Using the same data, the calculated MBSMoM with five categories is
1.10 times the value using nine categories.
Long (2013) evaluated 2,483 father/son pairs using Marriage Registry data in
Britain and five categories to measure occupations of fathers and their sons between 1859
and 1874. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.4845,
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meaning that mobility was 48.45 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Long (2013) also evaluated 4,153 married individuals in Britain using Census data and
five categories to measure intragenerational occupational mobility between 1851 and
1881. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.4077, meaning
that mobility was 40.77 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. In
addition, Long (2013) evaluated 2,716 father/son pairs from wage occupational class III
using Census data in Britain and five categories to measure occupations of fathers in
1851 and their sons in 1881. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM
value of 0.4024, meaning that mobility was 40.24 percent away from the mobility under
FM assumptions. Finally, Long (2013) evaluated 3,460 father/son pairs using the OMS
in Britain and five categories to measure occupations of fathers and their sons in 1972.
This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1390, so mobility was
13.9 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Auten et. al. (2013)
Auten et. al. (2013) used SOI, Tax, and SSA data to evaluate relative
intragenerational income mobility in the US for individuals, parents, and children. They
evaluated individuals using six quantiles to measure individual intragenerational income
mobility between 1987 and 2007. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an
MBSMoM value of 0.1735, meaning that mobility was 17.35 percent away from the
mobility under FM assumptions. Auten et. al. (2013) also evaluated individuals using
quintiles to measure individual intragenerational income mobility between 1987 and
2007. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1904, meaning
that mobility was 19.04 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Using
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the same data, the calculated MBSMoM with five categories is 1.10 times the value using
six categories.
Auten et. al. (2013) evaluated parent/child pairs using six quantiles to measure
intergenerational income mobility between parents in 1987 and their children in 2007.
This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0782, meaning that
mobility was 7.82 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Auten et. al.
(2013) also evaluated parent/child pairs using quintiles to measure intergenerational
income mobility between parents in 1987 and their children in 2007. This mobility
transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0741, meaning that mobility was
7.41 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions. Using the same data, the
calculated MBSMoM with six categories is 1.06 times the value using five categories.
Urahn et al. (2012)
Urahn et al. (2012) used the PSID to evaluate relative intergenerational income,
earnings, and wealth mobility in the US for parents and children. They evaluated 2,736
parent/child pairs in the US and used quintiles to measure intergenerational income
mobility of parents in 1968 and their children in 2009. This mobility transition matrix
resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1344, meaning that mobility was 13.44 percent away
from the mobility under FM assumptions. Urahn et al. (2012) also evaluated 1,014
father/son pairs in the US and used quintiles to measure intergenerational earnings
mobility of fathers in 1968 and their sons in 2009. This mobility transition matrix
resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1095, meaning that mobility was 10.95 percent away
from the mobility under FM assumptions. In addition, Urahn et al. (2012) evaluated
2,277 parent/child pairs in the US and used quintiles to measure intergenerational wealth
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mobility of parents in 1968 and their children in 2009. This mobility transition matrix
resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1615, meaning that mobility was 16.15 percent away
from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Urahn et al. (2012) evaluated White parent/child pairs in the US and used
quintiles to measure intergenerational income mobility of parents in 1968 and their
children in 2009. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of
0.1140, meaning that mobility was 11.4 percent away from the mobility under FM
assumptions. Urahn et al. (2012) also evaluated Black parent/child pairs in the US and
used quintiles to measure intergenerational income mobility of parents in 1968 and their
children in 2009. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of
0.0703, meaning that mobility was 7.03 percent away from the mobility under FM
assumptions. Urahn et al. (2012) evaluated White parent/child pairs in the US and used
terciles to measure intergenerational wealth mobility of parents in 1968 and their children
in 2009. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.1015,
meaning that mobility was 10.15 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
In addition, Urahn et al. (2012) evaluated Black parent/child pairs in the US and used
terciles to measure intergenerational wealth mobility of parents in 1968 and their children
in 2009. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of 0.0267,
meaning that mobility was 2.67 percent away from the mobility under FM assumptions.
Urahn et al. (2012) evaluated non-college-graduate parent/child pairs in the US
and used terciles to measure intergenerational income mobility of parents in 1968 and
their children in 2009. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of
0.1087, meaning that mobility was 10.87 percent away from the mobility under FM
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assumptions. Urahn et al. (2012) also evaluated college-graduate parent/child pairs in the
US and used terciles to measure intergenerational income mobility of parents in 1968 and
their children in 2009. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of
0.0588, meaning that mobility was 5.88 percent away from the mobility under FM
assumptions. Urahn et al. (2012) evaluated non-college-graduate parent/child pairs in the
US and used terciles to measure intergenerational wealth mobility of parents in 1968 and
their children in 2009. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of
0.1354, meaning that mobility was 13.54 percent away from the mobility under FM
assumptions. In addition, Urahn et al. (2012) evaluated college-graduate parent/child
pairs in the US and used terciles to measure intergenerational wealth mobility of parents
in 1968 and their children in 2009. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an
MBSMoM value of 0.1333, meaning that mobility was 13.33 percent away from the
mobility under FM assumptions.
Eberharter (2013)
Eberharter (2013) used the GSEOP, the PSID, and the BHPS from the CNEF to
evaluate relative intergenerational income mobility in Germany, the US, and Britain for
parents and children. They evaluated 2,128 parent/child pairs in Germany and used
quintiles to measure intergenerational income mobility of parents in 1988-1992 and their
children in 2005-2009. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM value of
0.1174, meaning that mobility was 11.74 percent away from the mobility under FM
assumptions. Eberharter (2013) also evaluated 2,585 parent/child pairs in the US and
used quintiles to measure intergenerational income mobility of parents in 1987-1991 and
their children in 2003-2007. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM
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value of 0.1438, meaning that mobility was 14.38 percent away from the mobility under
FM assumptions. In addition, Eberharter (2013) evaluated 1,840 parent/child pairs in
Britain and used quintiles to measure intergenerational income mobility of parents in
1991-1995 and their children in 2004-2008. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an
MBSMoM value of 0.1529, meaning that mobility was 15.29 percent away from the
mobility under FM assumptions.
Dardanoni et al. (2012)
Dardanoni et al. (2012) used the National Child Development Study (NCDS) to
evaluate absolute mobility in occupations in Britain for fathers and sons. They evaluated
1,942 father/son pairs in Britain and used three categories to measure occupations of
fathers in 1974 and their sons in 1991. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an
MBSMoM value of 0.1987, meaning that mobility was 19.87 percent away from the
mobility under FM assumptions. Dardanoni et al. (2012) also evaluated 1,104 father/son
pairs in Britain and used three categories to measure wage level mobility of fathers in
1974 and their sons in 1991. This mobility transition matrix resulted in an MBSMoM
value of 0.0802, meaning that mobility was 8.02 percent away from the mobility under
FM assumptions.
Trends and Patterns of Mobility Generalized from the Values of the MBSMoM
With 92 mobility matrices in 22 different studies, the overall mean computed
value for the MBSMoM using all the different mobility variables is 0.1714 (Standard
Deviation = 0.1030), with a minimum of 0.0126 and a maximum of 0.5086. This
indicates that overall mobility is approximately seventeen percent away from the mobility
expected under FM assumptions.
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When comparing the MBSMoMs of various countries, one finds some interesting
differences. With 35 mobility matrices in 13 different studies, the mean computed value
for the MBSMoM for the US is 0.1614 (Standard Deviation = 0.0847), with a minimum
of 0.0126 and a maximum of 0.3839. This indicates that the US shows mobility that is
16.14 percent away from the mobility expected under FM assumptions. With 20 mobility
matrices in 5 different studies, the mean computed value for the MBSMoM for the
United Kingdom (UK) is 0.2407 (Standard Deviation = 0.1195), with a minimum of
0.0350 and a maximum of 0.4845. It is possible that the UK has less mobility than the
US and is farther away from FM. With 12 mobility matrices in 2 different studies, the
mean computed value for the MBSMoM for China is 0.1210 (Standard Deviation =
0.0571), with a minimum of 0.0565 and a maximum of 0.2239. This indicates that China
shows more mobility as a percentage between outcomes under assumptions of FM and
LM than the US. From 3 mobility matrices in one study, the mean computed value for
the MBSMoM for India is 0.1448 (Standard Deviation = 0.0150), with a minimum of
0.1275 and a maximum of 0.1543. This indicates that India falls between China and the
US when it comes to mobility as a percentage between FM and LM. Germany, on the
other hand shows less mobility as a percentage between FM and LM than any of the other
countries. With 3 mobility matrices in 2 different studies, the mean computed value for
the MBSMoM for Germany is 0.3638 (Standard Deviation = 0.1747), with a minimum of
0.1698 and a maximum of 0.5086. Germany seems to exhibit less mobility than the US
and UK.
Comparing the MBSMoMs of different measures of mobility like income, wealth,
and occupation reveals differences between them. With 28 mobility matrices in 5
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different studies, the mean computed value for the MBSMoM using occupation as the
mobility variable is 0.2342 (Standard Deviation = 0.0919), with a minimum of 0.0801
and a maximum of 0.4845. This indicates that income mobility is approximately 23.42
percent away from the mobility expected under FM assumptions. With 36 mobility
matrices in 20 different studies, the mean computed value for the MBSMoM using
income as the mobility variable is 0.1613 (Standard Deviation = 0.1076), with a
minimum of 0.0306 and a maximum of 0.5086. This indicates that income mobility is
approximately 16.13 percent away from the mobility expected under FM assumptions.
With 6 mobility matrices in 3 different studies, the mean computed value for the
MBSMoM using wealth as the mobility variable is 0.1179 (Standard Deviation =
0.0727), with a minimum of 0.0126 and a maximum of 0.2243. This indicates that
wealth mobility is approximately 11.79 percent away from the mobility expected under
FM assumptions. The measure of wealth seems to show more mobility than income and
income more than occupation.
Comparing the MBSMoMs using different sizes of mobility matrices shows
differences. With 15 mobility matrices in 9 different studies, the mean computed value
for the MBSMoM using income as the mobility variable in the US and Canada using five
income partitions is 0.1610 (Standard Deviation = 0.1038), with a minimum of 0.0589
and a maximum of 0.3839. This indicates that income mobility in the US and Canada
with five income partitions is 16.1 percent away from the mobility expected under FM
assumptions. With 4 mobility matrices in 3 different studies, the mean computed value
for the MBSMoM using income as the mobility variable in the US and Canada using ten
income partitions is 0.0921 (Standard Deviation = 0.0509), with a minimum of 0.0306
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and a maximum of 0.1444. This indicates that income mobility in the US and Canada
with ten income partitions is 9.21 percent away from the mobility expected under FM
assumptions. In addition, using the same studies to compare the five and ten income
partitions shows a significant difference in the computed values of the MBSMoMs. With
4 mobility matrices in 3 different studies in the US and Canada, the mean computed value
for the MBSMoM using income as the mobility variable and five income partitions is
0.1634 (Standard Deviation = 0.0920), with a minimum of 0.0589 and a maximum of
0.2580. With the same 4 mobility matrices in the same 3 studies, the mean computed
value for the MBSMoM using income as the mobility variable and ten income partitions
is only 0.0921 (Standard Deviation = 0.0509), with a minimum of 0.0306 and a
maximum of 0.1444. Mobility seems to be greater when using more partitions, even
when using the exact same data.
Comparing the MBSMoMs taken from studies evaluating the 19th and 20th
centuries shows a difference in meritocracy-based mobility. With 23 mobility matrices in
4 different studies evaluating time periods during the 19th century, the mean computed
value for the MBSMoM is 0.2510 (Standard Deviation = 0.1020), with a minimum of
0.0601 and a maximum of 0.4845. This indicates that mobility during the 19th century
was 25.1 percent away from the mobility expected under FM assumptions.

With 66

mobility matrices in 18 different studies evaluating time periods during the 20th century,
the mean computed value for the MBSMoM is 0.1409 (Standard Deviation = 0.0889),
with a minimum of 0.0126 and a maximum of 0.5086. This indicates that mobility
during the 20th century was only 14.09 percent away from the mobility expected under
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FM assumptions. Mobility seemed to be greater during the 20th century than the 19th
century.
Comparing the MBSMoMs taken from studies evaluating intragenerational,
intergenerational, and multigenerational data shows differences in meritocracy-based
mobility. With 27 mobility matrices in 7 different studies evaluating intragenerational
data, the mean computed value for the MBSMoM is 0.2070 (Standard Deviation =
0.1237), with a minimum of 0.0565 and a maximum of 0.5086. This indicates that
intragenerational mobility was 20.7 percent away from the mobility expected under FM
assumptions.

With 58 mobility matrices in 16 different studies evaluating

intergenerational data, the mean computed value for the MBSMoM is 0.1634 (Standard
Deviation = 0.0918), with a minimum of 0.0126 and a maximum of 0.4845. This
indicates that intergenerational mobility was 16.34 percent away from the mobility
expected under FM assumptions. With 7 mobility matrices in 3 different studies
evaluating multigenerational data, the mean computed value for the MBSMoM is 0.1006
(Standard Deviation = 0.0458), with a minimum of 0.0350 and a maximum of 0.1698.
This indicates that multigenerational mobility was 10.06 percent away from the mobility
expected under FM assumptions. Mobility seems to be higher when more generations are
included.

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
As mentioned earlier, the MBSMoM suffers from the same limitations as all
summary measures using mobility matrices, except that it has a standalone interpretation
based on its calculation being a percentage difference between outcomes based on
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assumptions of FM and LM. I calculated the MBSMoM values for 92 mobility matrices
from 22 previous studies of mobility. Averaging the results of all 92 mobility matrices in
22 different studies, results in an overall mean computed value for the MBSMoM of
0.1714. This indicates that the average overall mobility of multiple countries, using
multiple variables, over the last two centuries is approximately 17.14 percent away from
the mobility expected under FM assumptions.
Dividing mobility matrices from the 22 previous studies into those evaluating
different countries indicates, on average, that mobility, in order of highest to lowest, is
China (MBSMoM = 0.1210), India (MBSMoM = 0.1448), United States (MBSMoM =
0.1614), United Kingdom (MBSMoM = 0.2407), and Germany (MBSMoM = 0.3638).
Germany was farthest away (36.38%) from mobility expected under FM assumptions
while China was the closest (12.1%) to mobility expected under FM assumptions. This
indicates that mobility may be quite different by country and may be unrelated to the
country level of standard of living. Mobility may be related to structural opportunity,
degree of inequality, and/or government policies.
Separating mobility matrices from the 22 previous studies into those evaluating
occupation, income, and wealth indicates, on average, that mobility using occupation
(MBSMoM = 0.2342) is farther away from mobility expected under FM assumptions
than mobility using income (MBSMoM = 0.1613). In addition, mobility using income
(MBSMoM = 0.1613) is farther away from mobility expected under FM assumptions
than mobility using wealth (MBSMoM = 0.1179). This indicates that mobility studies
tend to show less mobility using occupation as the study variable than income. In
addition, these mobility studies tend to show less mobility using income as the study
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variable than wealth. Wealth as a study variable tends to result in lower values of
MBSMoM than income, and income lower values than occupation, which indicates that
the study variable may influence the mobility measured.
Using 15 mobility matrices from the same 9 studies using income as the mobility
variable indicates that income mobility with five income partitions is 16.10 percent away
from the mobility expected under FM assumptions while the results of 4 mobility
matrices from 3 studies using ten income partitions results in income mobility being only
9.21 percent away from the mobility expected under FM assumptions. Using the same 4
mobility matrices from the same 3 studies using income as the mobility variable indicates
that income mobility with five income partitions is 16.34 percent away from the mobility
expected under FM assumptions while using ten income partitions results in income
mobility being only 9.21 percent away from the mobility expected under FM
assumptions. The only difference is the number of income partitions, showing that
mobility tends to be closer to that expected under assumptions of FM with more
partitions.
Separating mobility matrices between the 19th and 20th centuries for these studies
indicates, on average, that mobility during the 19th century was 25.1 percent away from
the mobility expected under FM assumptions while during the 20th century mobility was
only 14.09 percent away from the mobility expected under FM assumptions. Based on
this result, it seems that mobility may have moved closer to that expected under
assumptions of FM over time.
Separating mobility matrices from the 22 previous studies into those evaluating
intragenerational, intergenerational, and multigenerational variables indicates, on
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average, that mobility using intragenerational variables (MBSMoM = 0.2070) is farther
away from mobility expected under FM assumptions than mobility using
intergenerational variables (MBSMoM = 0.1634). In addition, mobility using
intergenerational variables (MBSMoM = 0.1634) is farther away from mobility expected
under FM assumptions than mobility using multigenerational variables (MBSMoM =
0.1006). This indicates that mobility studies tend to show less mobility using
intragenerational variables than intergenerational. In addition, these mobility studies tend
to show less mobility using intergenerational variables than multigenerational. This is
consistent with previous studies and common sense that mobility increases with the
number of generations included.
I developed two different SMoMs and an MBSMoM using FM and LM
assumptions. Until now, no one has computed a stickiness meritocracy-based measure of
mobility using mobility transition matrices calculated as a percentage between outcomes
based on FM and LM assumptions. In addition to conveying the percentage between
outcomes expected under FM and LM assumptions, the MBSMoM may be used to make
comparisons of population subsets, across time and space, and by identity (race, ethnicity,
nationality, gender, sexuality, religion, ability, age, etc.). We may compare mobility over
time and across geographic boundaries, drawing conclusions about meritocratic
differences. The MBSMoM may help further our understanding of the roles of race,
ethnicity, gender, sexuality, ability, age, etc. on intragenerational, intergenerational, and
multigenerational correlations of class, education, occupation, consumption, income, and
wealth in addition to comparisons between different identities over time and geography.
The MBSMoM more fully describes the differences in outcomes attributable to these
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identities. In addition, it may help us better understand the need for interactional
variables between the channels of class, occupation, consumption, income, and wealth
transmission, such as gifts and bequests, education, marriage, homeownership, and
business ownership.
Future Research
There is still a need of much future research in studies of mobility. Keister (2014)
identified two important gaps in the income and wealth inequality research. There has
been less emphasis on explaining wealth inequality than income inequality and there is
little knowledge about the demographics and life course effects on income and wealth.
Pfeffer and Killewald (2018) also identified opportunities for future research, including
earlier investments made on behalf of children, sources of disparities between Whites and
blacks, family size adjustments, home values as asset proxy, neighborhood effects,
differences among other minority groups, reverse transfers, causality, and life-cycle
effects. Just as Pfeffer and Killewald (2019) found significant disparities in mobility
between Whites and Blacks, racial differences in mobility have persisted throughout
history whether measured by earnings gap or rank gap (Bayer and Charles, 2018; Pfeffer
& Killewald, 2019). There is still “deep-seated and systematic differences in economic
outcomes along lines of gender, ethnicity, social class and geographic location” (Allen,
2011, p. 367). While there has been some research regarding the differences between
Whites and Blacks regarding intragenerational, intergenerational, and multigenerational
mobility, larger samples are needed in order to compare outcomes among various races,
ethnicities, genders, sexualities, abilities, ages, etc. (Allen, 2011; Pfeffer and Killewald,
2018). For example, “estimates…by race can provide insight on whether racial
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differences in the US are likely to be eliminated and, if so, how long it might take” and
might “shed light on the mechanisms behind the relatively high degree of
intergenerational persistence of inequality in the United States” (Mazumder, 2014, p. 1).
Social mobility research has included intragenerational, intergenerational, and
multigenerational transmission of status. Since individuals may continue improving their
abilities and climb the social class ladder throughout their lives, combining
intergenerational and intragenerational mobility into one theory makes sense for future
research (Charles et al., 2013; Cheng & Song, 2019; Saunders, 2010). We may be able to
combine intergenerational and intragenerational mobility by creating and comparing
different intragenerational mobility transition matrices for those who come from different
initial parent categories or quantiles, showing the different paths of mobility from parent
to child and across the children’s lives. (Burkhauser & Couch, 2008).
It seems that most, if not all, mobility studies have made the same assumption that
mobility is randomly and evenly distributed among the population. Future studies may
relax this assumption, especially with linked data, to verify who is actually mobile. It
may be that the same individuals or households are moving up and down across multiple
periods. Intergenerational income and wealth effects research may also concentrate on
explaining their transference from parents through inheritance of personal and family
traits, various networks, education, and other forms of capital. What may be more
important is to concentrate on intergenerational well-being, life-course welfare, equality
of opportunity, or real outcomes rather than focusing on relative inequality. There may
be several alternative ways to measure class, occupation, income, and wealth mobility,
which should be investigated. There is a need to determine the most appropriate time
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lags for measuring mobility, take account of non-linearities, and the impact of structural
systems such as politics, welfare, and cultural values on measuring mobility. No matter
the direction taken in future research, an MBSMoM over time and between groups is
needed so comparisons of intragenerational, intergenerational, and multigenerational
transmission of class, education, occupation, consumption, income, and wealth may have
meaning. Not only does an MBSMoM have meaning in comparison between geography
and time (like other measures), they also have stand-alone meaning as a measure at a
single place and time. They measure the percent distance between optimal mobility
(under assumptions of FM) and complete immobility (under assumptions of LM) (Fields,
2010).
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Mobility Transition Matrices
(a) Mobility Transition Matrix (%) for LM
Parental Wealth Quintile
1

Lowest
Quintile 2
Quintile 3
Quintile 4
Highest

2

3

Lowest

Quintile 2

Quintile 3

100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0

Child's Wealth Quintile
4
5
Quintile
4
Highest
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0

(b) Mobility transition matrix (%) for FM
Parental Wealth Quintile
1
2
Lowest Quintile 2
Lowest
Quintile 2
Quintile 3
Quintile 4
Highest

20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0

20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0

3
Quintile 3
20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0

Child's Wealth Quintile
4
5
Quintile 4
Highest
20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0

20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0

(c) Wealth Mobility transition matrix (%) from Charles and Hurst (2003)
Parental Wealth Quintile
1
2
Lowest Quintile 2
Lowest
Quintile 2
Quintile 3
Quintile 4
Highest

36.0
26.0
16.0
15.0
11.0

29.0
24.0
21.0
13.0
16.0

3
Quintile 3
16.0
24.0
25.0
20.0
14.0
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Child's Wealth Quintile
4
5
Quintile 4 Highest
12.0
15.0
24.0
26.0
24.0

7.0
12.0
15.0
26.0
36.0
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Table 2. Studies of Mobility Transition Matrices
Study
Charles and Hurst (2003)
Charles and Hurst (2003)
Pfeffer and Killewald (2018)
Jäntti and Jenkins (2013)
Jäntti and Jenkins (2013)
Jäntti and Jenkins (2013)
Jäntti and Jenkins (2013)
Mazumder (2005)
Mazumder (2005)
Mazumder (2005)
Corak and Heisz (1999)
Corak and Heisz (1999)
Cowell (2017)
Cowell (2017)
Chen and Cowell (2017)
Chen and Cowell (2017)
Chen and Cowell (2017)
Chen and Cowell (2017)
Chen and Cowell (2017)
Chen and Cowell (2017)
Chen and Cowell (2017)
Chen and Cowell (2017)
Chen and Cowell (2017)
Chen and Cowell (2017)
Formby et. al. (2004)
Formby et. al. (2004)
Formby et. al. (2004)
Formby et. al. (2004)
Mishra (2018)
Mishra (2018)
Mishra (2018)
Long & Ferrie (2018)
Long & Ferrie (2018)
Long & Ferrie (2018)
Long & Ferrie (2018)
Long & Ferrie (2018)
Long & Ferrie (2018)
Long & Ferrie (2018)
Long & Ferrie (2018)
Long & Ferrie (2018)
Altham & Ferrie (2007)
Altham & Ferrie (2007)
Neidhöfer & Stockhausen (2019)
Neidhöfer & Stockhausen (2019)
Neidhöfer & Stockhausen (2019)
Long & Ferrie (2013)
Long & Ferrie (2013)
Long & Ferrie (2013)
Long & Ferrie (2013)
Long & Ferrie (2013)
Long & Ferrie (2013)
Goodman (1965, 1969)
Goodman (1965, 1969)
Goodman (1965, 1969)
Pfeffer & Killewald (2015)
Pfeffer & Killewald (2015)
Pfeffer & Killewald (2015)
Pfeffer & Killewald (2015)
Pfeffer & Killewald (2015)
Mazumder (2014)
Mazumder (2014)
Charles, et. al. (2014)
Charles, et. al. (2014)

Database
PSID
PSID
PSID
PSID
PSID
PSID
PSID
SIPP/SSA
SIPP/SSA
SIPP/SSA
Tax
Tax
CHNS
CHNS
CHNS
CHNS
CHNS
CHNS
CHNS
CHNS
CHNS
CHNS
CHNS
CHNS
PSID
GSOEP
PSID
GSOEP
IHDS
IHDS
IHDS
Census
Census
Census
Census
Census
Census
Census
Census
Census
Census
Census
GSEOP/CNEF
PSID/CNEF
BHPS/CNEF
OMS
OCGS
Census
Census
Census
Census
N/R
N/R
N/R
PSID
PSID
PSID
PSID
PSID
SIPP/SSA
SIPP/SSA
PSID
PSID

Sample
Description

Population
White
Black
White
Black
White
Black

Sample
Size
1,491
1,491
2,001
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
2,843
2,600
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
3,600
3,358
3,400
3,442
5,000
6,000
5,000
6,000
40,018
N/R
N/R
4,943
4,887
4,002
43,701
43,701
43,701
1,983
1,043
948
8,999
17,733
1,890
5,554
1,392
1,123
2,988
3,076
2,005
2,632
2,499
3,497
2,391
3,497
1,975
1,105
799
1,428
942
14,757
2,025
3,000
3,000

Measure

Location

Quan
n

Origin
Time Period

Wealth
Wealth
Wealth
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Earnings
Earnings
Earnings
Earnings
Income
Income
Income
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Education
Education
Education
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Wealth
Wealth
Wealth
Home Own
Home Own
Income
Income
Expenditure
Income

USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
Canada
Canada
China
China
China
China
China-Rural
China-Rural
China-Urban
China-Urban
China
China
China
China
USA
Germany
USA
Germany
All India
Rural India
Urban India
Britain
Britain
Britain
USA
USA
USA
Britain
Britain
Britain
USA
USA
Germany
USA
UK
Britain
USA
Britain
USA
USA
USA
Britain
Denmark
Britain
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA

5
5
5
10
5
10
5
10
5
4
10
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
5
5
3
3
2
2
5
5
4
4

1984-1989
1984-1989
1984
1979
1979
1989
1989
1985
1985
1985
1982
1982
1989
2000
1989
2000
1989
2000
1989
2000
1989
1991
2004
2009
1985
1985
1985
1985
2005
2005
2005
1851
1881
1851
1850
1880
1850
1881
1881
1881
1850
1880
Parent/Grand
Parent/Grand
Parent/Grand
1949
1955
1851
1850
1860
1880
N/R
N/R
N/R
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1986
1986
Parents
Parents
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Destination Gen MBSMoM
Time Period Span Value
1999
1999
2013
1988
1988
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1995
1995
2000
2011
2000
2011
2000
2011
2000
2011
1991
1993
2006
2011
1990
1990
1990
1990
2012
2012
2012
1881
1911
1911
1880
1910
1910
1911
1911
1911
1880
1910
1960-1985
1960-1985
1960-1985
1972
1973
1881
1880
1880
1900
N/R
N/R
N/R
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2007
2007
2009
2009

2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
2

0.1154
0.0126
0.1494
0.1213
0.2206
0.1444
0.2580
0.0721
0.1160
0.1196
0.0306
0.0589
0.0789
0.1127
0.0789
0.1127
0.0565
0.0834
0.0938
0.1613
0.1882
0.1768
0.2061
0.2239
0.3670
0.4131
0.3839
0.5086
0.1543
0.1275
0.1525
0.3204
0.2424
0.1113
0.2418
0.2776
0.1421
0.2227
0.0601
0.1198
0.2045
0.1875
0.1698
0.1020
0.0350
0.2015
0.1493
0.3090
0.2161
0.2222
0.2664
0.2371
0.2720
0.1868
0.1386
0.2243
0.0669
0.0750
0.0690
0.0881
0.0860
0.1324
0.1633
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Long (2013)
Long (2013)
Long (2013)
Long (2013)
Long (2013)
Long (2013)
Long (2013)
Long (2013)
Long (2013)
Auten, et. al. (2013)
Auten, et. al. (2013)
Auten, et. al. (2013)
Auten, et. al. (2013)
Pew (2012)
Pew (2012)
Pew (2012)
Pew (2012)
Pew (2012)
Pew (2012)
Pew (2012)
Pew (2012)
Pew (2012)
Pew (2012)
Pew (2012)
Eberharter (2013)
Eberharter (2013)
Eberharter (2013)
Dardanoni, et al. (2008)
Dardanoni, et al. (2008)

Census
Census
Census
Census
Linked Census
Marriage Reg
OMS
Census
Married
Census
Wage, Class III
SOI-Tax-SSA
SOI-Tax-SSA
SOI-Tax-SSA
SOI-Tax-SSA
PSID
PSID
PSID
PSID
White
PSID
Black
PSID
White
PSID
Black
PSID
Non-CG
PSID
College Grad
PSID
Non-CG
PSID
College Grad
GSOEP/CNEF
PSID/CNEF
BHPS/CNEF
NCDS
NCDS

Average:
Minimum:
Maximum:
STD:

PSID
SIPP
SSA
CHNS
GSOEP
IHDS
BHPS
CNEF
OMS
OCGS
NLSY
SOI
NCDS

12,516
4,071
7,749
12,516
12,516
2,483
3,460
4,153
2,716
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
2,736
1,014
2,277
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
2,128
2,585
1,840
1,942
1,104

Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Wage Level
Income
Income
Income
Income
Income
Earnings
Wealth
Income
Income
Wealth
Wealth
Income
Income
Wealth
Wealth
Income
Income
Income
Occupation
Wage Level

6369
799
43701
10166

Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Survey of Income and Program Participation
Social Security Administration
China Health and Nutrition Survey
German Socio-Economic Panel
India Human Development Survey
British Household Panel Survey
Cross-National Equivalent File
Oxford Mobility Study
Occupational Change in a Generation Survey
National Longitudinal Survery of Youth
Statistics of Income
National Child Development Study
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Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
Germany
USA
Britain
Britain
Britain

5
5
5
9
5
5
5
5
5
6
5
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
3
3
3
3
3
5
5
5
3
3

1851
1881
1851
1851
1851
Father
Father
1851
1851
1987
1987
1987
1987
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1988-1992
1987-1991
1991-1995
1974
1974

1881
1901
1881
1881
1881
1859-1874
1972
1881
1881
2007
2007
2007
2007
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2005-2009
2003-2007
2004-2008
1991
1991

2
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

0.2413
0.2007
0.3942
0.2369
0.2615
0.4845
0.1390
0.4077
0.4024
0.1735
0.1904
0.0782
0.0741
0.1344
0.1095
0.1615
0.1140
0.0703
0.1015
0.0267
0.1087
0.0588
0.1354
0.1333
0.1174
0.1438
0.1529
0.1987
0.0802

5
2
10
2

1949
1850
2009
57

1973
1880
2013
50

2
1
3
1

0.1714
0.0126
0.5086
0.1030

